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WORLD TARIFF POLICIES from 1900 to 1933
THEIR TREND AND SIGNIFICANCE
INTRODUCTION
During the period chosen for this study many epoch
making events have occurred, giving rise to a great variety
of complex problems. The tremendous industrial expansion
which began the latter part of the previous century, par-
ticularly in Europe and North America, seemed to indicate
the possibility of a hitherto undreamed of wealth and pros-
perity. This trend continued into the early years of the
present century, the outstanding characteristic of which
has been large-scale industrial production, a constantly
increasing productivity of labor through specialization
and methods of efficiency,
Russia, Latin America, and the East find the pic-
ture an attractive one; wealth and prosperity appear to be
measured by the ability of a people to produce and consume
more goods. They are concentrating on means to bring about
such an end for themselves. The price to be exacted for
such potential well-being is perhaps the development of
reasonable, effective, and considerate methods by which
such a giant of materialism may be controlled; be forced
to maintain an adequate measure of balance. At present
each nation is very reluctant to show any consideration
for others in the development of its industrial and com-
merical policies. Any wide degree of specialization re-
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quires a reasonable consideration for the specialty of an-
other.
Without doubt the most staggering of the events
during this period was the World War, widely heralded as
the "war to end war". The source of the quotation is
unknown, probably it was born of the propaganda which is
part and parcel of all things great and powerful today.
The war caused tremendous changes in the lives of the
people of all nations, those remaining neutral as well as
those directly involved in the conflict. Immediate and
drastic restrictions of international trade were applied
by the governments of the various fighting nations in order
to control the supplies of foodstuffs and essential war
materials. Restrictions of this kind were intended to
apply only for the duration of the conflict; purely emer-
gency measures, but many of them have not been lifted. The
character, volume, and direction of international trade
suffered radical changes. Nations completely deprived of
their former markets and sources of supply sought others.
In some cases the new markets proved to be more advanta-
geous than the old and much of the business continued
through the new channels. In other cases the reverse is
true, causing trade to attempt a return to its former ways.
Whichever situation happens to be true, adjustments of no
small proportion have to be made and the maintenance of
restrictions do not facilitate the adjustments.
The war showed economic considerations to be
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quite as important as military and it is safe to say that
nothing stands out more prominently during the period of
years since the war than the predominance of the economic
problem. In an effort to correct the many serious malad-
justments the world has become desperately involved economi-
cally; finds Facisra and Communism taking firm root; the
tide of Nationalism running high and finally sinks into a
world-wide economic depression with a complete breakdown
of international trade and monetary exchange.
Tariffs can not be dissociated from international
trade and exchange, nor can world recovery from the effects
of the war and the subsequent economic depression be dis-
sociated from tariff policies. Probably this first propo-
sition will go unchallenged but the second enjoys no such
immunity today. There are those people in positions of
influence who quite sincerely believe the fundamental lesson
taught by the World War to be that each nation must become
economically self-sufficient; must grow and produce all
essential goods regardless of the cost or the natural dis-
advantage that will often exist - confirmed nationalists and
isolationists. Protests, however, may now be heard, rising
with increasing volume against such national and interna-
tional suicide.
It is with the futility of attempting to disso-
ciate tariffs from world recovery that this study deals.
The treaty-makers at Versailles recognized the signifi-
cance of the association but were unable to make it serve
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any constructive end in the final product of their delibera-
tions. They declared economic conflicts among nations to
1
be the chief obstacle to peace. Yet the treaty of peace
which they finally offered to the world seems to add to
the certainty of future economic conflict rather than to
contribute toward its gradual elimination; a point which
is amplified later in this study.
Purpose and Method
Before stating what the purpose of the present
study is, it might be well to indicate what it is not.
It is not to attempt an abstract discussion of the relative
merits of protection and free trade as principles of nation-
al policy. A vast amount of the abstract discussion has
been produced over a long period of years, a discouragingly
large portion of which is quite useless except to serve the
particular group or industry promoting it. Freedom of
trade stands firmly as a principle in economic theory but
fails to win adoption as a practical policy among nations.
As the various nations view their chances of economic sur-
vival, complete freedom of trade appears as a policy only
for the strong, but the strongest nation of them all con-
tinues to travel in the opposite direction. During the
period of this study there is in evidence a strong change
of sentiment. The belief is gaining ground that more
friendly exchange relations among the various countries
1. Delle-Donne, STP, 274.
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may be necessary to their mutual recovery and stabilization.
It is a sentiment slow in growth and springs from no con-
scious recognition of economic theory - rather it is a
matter of trial and error which appears to be dictated
solely by profit and loss accounts.
Fear and other emotions less worthy have been at
work during these thirty years building a set of interna-
tional conditions directly opposed to an industrial trend
which is very distinct and very important in its implica-
tions. It is the purpose of this study to examine the
significance of various tariff policies in the trend of
events just before and after the World War.
The method employed includes a study of the par-
ticular trend and conditions in a selected number of im-
portant trading nations; a brief comparison of the meth-
ods of making tariff policies in three of these same
countries; a survey of the particular relations of the
tariff to agriculture, war debts, and the public in the
recent and impending economic changes. The approach
attempts to set forth the general upward trend of trade
restrictions as opposed to the generally proclaimed de-
sire and necessity for international peace.
From the great volume of available trade statis-
tics a few short tables are drawn in order to emphasize
certain trends rather than to bear any considerable burden
of the proof.
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CHAPTER I .
GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TARIFF
The Effect on Prices
There are certain facts incident to the imposition
of customs duties, whether they happen to be imposed for
purposes of revenue, industrial protection, or both, which
ought to be in mind whenever a study of policies and trends
is undertaken. Such facts are set down here with no de-
sire to invade the controversial field of tariff discus-
sion with which most people are all too familiar. It is
true that many of these facts are used in popular discus-
sion, but by placing an intentional limit on their applica-
tion the general significance is hidden. This point ap-
pears again below under the topic "The Public and the
Tariff.
The effect of duty levied on the importation of
a commodity on the domestic price of that commodity is one
of the points which is often misrepresented or greatly ex-
aggerated. If consumption of the commodity is widely dif-
fused there is more potent reason for the exaggeration
than would be the case with a restricted demand. It is
by no means true that the imposition of a duty will raise
the price to the ultimate consumer under any and all con-
ditions. It is often said that such is the case, in fact
that a duty will operate immediately to raise the price to
the full amount of the tax. "The truth is that the levy
"Sb on riJIw sTsii n 30, SIB
>
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of a duty may have no influence at all on domestic price;
or it may raise the price of the dutiable commodity by its
full amount; or it may have an effect intermediate between
1
these extremes." In the same work and place from which
the foregoing is quoted, Professor Taussig continues to
discuss the three cases which he contends can and do
actually occur. Insofar as reference is now made to these
three cases, the same source was used indirectly.
There are many examples of the first and simplest
case in the tariffs of the United States; the case in
which a duty has no influence at all on domestic price.
The great basic staple commodities produced as cheaply in
one country as in another, offer the outstanding example.
The American farmer demands relief for falling prices of
his products and the higher prices of the goods he has to
buy, through means of duties levied on agricultural prod-
ucts. The last three tariff bills enacted by the United
States Congress found farm blocs demanding and receiving
extremely high tariff rates on many of their products, the
prices of which were bound to remain unaffected by such
duties. The farmer gets a life preserver in shape of an
anchor when, in response to his demands, duties are placed
on wheat, corn, meat and dairy products; goods which the
country exports rather than imports; goods which must seek
world markets and world prices.
1. Taussig, SAT, 4.
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Not a few manufactured articles have come to
find a place in this same class, particularly those that
can be produced in large quantities of few varieties.
Such manufactured commodities as can be produced in the
great industrial countries under mass methods of large
volume and small unit cost, are turned out sooner or
later in surplus quantities from the standpoint of any
home market demand, thus bringing them to world markets
and world prices.
The opposite of the case just mentioned can best
be given in Professor Taussig's own words:
"The second case - that in which the
price of the commodity rises by the full amount
of the duty - is found when imports continue
after its imposition. Nevertheless it is
not so easy as may seem at first sight, to
determine just how conclusive is the evidence
from the fact of importation. It will appear,
as we proceed in the discussion, that qualifi-
cations of various sorts need to be borne in
mind." 2
It will avail little in this particular survey to follow
the various qualifications which would be necessary in a
thorough process of economic reasoning. Such considera-
tions involve instances in which the foreign price is re-
duced by the whole amount of the duty or by only part of
the duty. The absorption of part or the whole of the duty
when the goods in question happen to be produced under
monopoly conditions, presents still another qualification.
In other words, there are special conditions and temporary
2. Taussig, SAT, 4.

conditions causing different degrees of price variation,
but under the usual conditions of trade; that is, com-
petitive conditions, the price of goods back of a tariff
wall will be higher than the price outside by the height
of the wall. Furthermore, despite various exceptions,
the consumer will tend to pay that much more for the goods
that continue to be imported over the wall.
Differing conditions bring about results difficult
to state with any certainty in the third or intermediate
case - that in which a tariff causes an increase in price
but not to the full amount of the tariff. Such a rate is
applied often to manufactured goods. Competition unques-
tionably exists; the goods in question could be secured
abroad more cheaply than domestic manufacturers are yet
able to produce them, and a prohibitive duty is usually
sought. That the domestic price will be higher is obvi-
ous but domestic competition will frequently operate to
prevent a realization of the full advantage. When a duty
is so high as to be actually prohibitive to further im-
portation, and many of them are of this kind today, it
becomes a difficult task to determine the precise effect
on the domestic price.
Opportunity for misrepresentation abounds when
such variable conditions exist in a matter affecting the
public interest. Certain commodities can be selected which
appear to support either side of a current tariff argu-
ment, which upon close examination would prove to have very
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definite limitations. Thus the present United States
tariff schedules applying to manufactures of cottons and
woolens, may be claimed not unduly high because of the im-
portation of great quantities of such merchandise despite
the duties. Examination would often disclose the fact that
the articles in question are not really comparable. Spe-
cial types, grades and qualities are very numerous among the
products of different countries which enter commerce; prod-
ucts which require particular racial skills not yet per-
fected outside of the country of their origin; luxury prod-
ucts, a demand for which continues from those who can
afford to pay, despite excessive rates; and a group of no
small importance, made up of branded or trade-marked commod-
ities which defy comparison through an established popular
choice.
Certain arguments have been successful in securing
public support of higher rates ever since the public first
3
heard of tariffs for protection against competing goods.
Very conspicuous among them has been the wisdom of foster-
ing the growth of industries essential to the country for
its fullest economic development; or as it has more often
run, essential to the country in case of war. In such in-
stances there is no subterfuge. A public burden in the
shape of increased prices has always been admitted and ex-
pected in order to attain a more important end. Early in
the history of economic theory John Stuart Mill, a staunch
3. See what is said below under "The Public and the Tariff".
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supporter of the principle of free trade conceded this one
application of protective duties as fitting and proper.
His theory, however, restricts such use from the standpoint
of type of industry, reason for the need, and length of
4
time that protection can properly be applied. Economists,
by and large, continue to adhere to the principle of free
trade as the only tenable one in theory, and invariably they
concede this one justification for protective duties.
In the United States the early tariffs were im-
posed for revenue only. Nationalistic tendencies began to
5
appear as early as 1790. Tariffs then took on a differ-
ent significance and prices were to be consciously affected.
Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, was di-
rected by Congress to prepare and report plans "for the en-
couragement and promotion of such manufactories as will
tend to render the United States independent of other na-
6
tions for essentials,
,
particularly for military supplies!'.
In his report Mr. Hamilton made an elaborate exposition
of the necessity for general protection against all manu-
factured goods which it is possible to produce within the
country. His report contained most of the ideas which
have been offered from his day to this in support of a sys-
7
tem of protective tariffs. He reached the conclusion
that any price increases which might result from the adop-
4. Mill, PPS, II., 538-9,
5. Ashley, MTH, 173.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
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tion of his measures would soon be more than offset by
production increases which would cause the return of lower
8
pri ces.
Effect on the Migration of Capital
Countries which supply agricultural products and
raw materials, exchange these for manufactured goods in
the normal relations of trade. In many cases they have not
been content to maintain this relationship. Gradually there
has been a transition from primary production to manufac-
ture of all or part of the goods formerly exchanged for
their raw products. The large industrial nations appear
better able to amass surplus capital in all its forms, and
part of it has naturally drifted to the countries in proc-
ess of development in the form of loans and investments.
India, Latin America, and Russia, have been using foreign
funds in recent years for internal development. The most
natural source of capital funds is commonly from those with
which trade relations are already established. Thus, in the
past, England has contributed to the development of many re-
gions with which she was trading finished goods for raw prod-
ucts. The return from capital loans and investments made up
her invisible balance of payments annually; her visible bal-
ance has always shown an excess of imports over exports. If
trade restrictions had reduced her excess of imports it is
difficult to see how she could have continued to be the
8. Ashley, MTH, 174.
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world's creditor.
The United States assumed a like position through
loans of capital to overseas nations during and after the
World War. In the five years preceding 1929 foreign in-
vestments were being made at the rate of one and one-half
9
billions annually. Mr. G.D.H. Cole, a prolific writer
and keen analyst of current world conditions, writes of the
tariff significance in this matter:
"This high tariff policy was easy enough
for America to sustain as long as she continued
to be in need of more capital for her internal
development than she was able to supply out of
her own resources. But when her vast loans of
capital to Europe and South America during and
after the war made her a great creditor nation
the position was somewhat different
.Vhile she remained an importer of capital she
was able to meet interest and sinking fund pay-
ments on her borrowings out of this excess of
products over her domestic needs; but when she
passed into the stage of exporting capital in-
stead of importing it, and of being owed large
sums by the rest of the world, she plainly
needed, if her accounts were to balance, an ex-
cess of imports instead of an excess of exports."
In Mr. Cole's opinion, America was able to carry
on in an artificial position during the few years before
the world depression, partly by means of the import of
gold and partly by leaving capital abroad in the form of
11
investments. But a man lends or invests money with the
intention of receiving a return from it; he will naturally
be opposed to regulations and laws that make it increas-
9. Johnsen, FT, 107.
10. Cole, G;VC, 355.
11. Ibid. , 356.
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ingly difficult for the debtor to pay. He will not be
satisfied to continue to balance his account yearly by
increasing his loans or investments in place of receiv-
ing dividends and interest; a policy which both England
and America have pursued since the war, thereby only add-
ing to their difficulties.
Quite apart, however, from the present entangle-
ment of war loans and reparations, existing tariff sched-
ules are significant in pointing the paradoxical situation
involved in foreign investments. In former years the Amer-
ican financial interests were among the most persistent ad-
herents to the policy of protection for American industry
in which their funds were invested. Now these same inter-
ests have billions of dollars invested in Cuban sugar
plants, automobile plants in Europe; textile and automobile
plants in Canada; South American copper mines, and Mexi-
can oil fields. The paradox is ably mentioned in the following:
"While broadly speaking, there has been
the intensest recurrence of high tariff demands
since the days of McKinley and the Dingley tariff
act of 1897, the bankers have been conspicuous by
their absence. No silk-hat delegation from Wall
Street has appeared to plead the cause of labor and
present the general economic interest of the people
of the United States in a high tariff. It was
otherwise in Mark Hanna 1 s time. Can the explanation
be that the bankers who have placed $15,000,000,000
of American funds abroad are now as much interested
in the prosperity of foreign factories as they are
in those of the United States? Perhaps they have
begun to wonder how they can collect their interest
and dividends if America sticks to a policy of high
tariffs." 12
12. Johnsen, FT, 104.
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Back of the investment situation there is dis-
cernible no great vision on the part of the bankers. The
profit motive remains the dominant one as in the past. Cap-
ital and industry stood together for high industrial pro-
tection as long as that policy helped to maintain a sub-
stantial return; as long as the one was entirely absorbed
by the other. The combination has been a powerful one,
hence any major defection can be very significant. An
economic depression tends to widen their differences.
Industry always seeks more protection when profits fall.
At such times capital seeks more profitable employment, in
recent years, frequently through foreign interests.
Effect on Industrial Development
The one exception in the free trade philosophy
of John Stuart Mill and held to be justified by most econo-
mists since; that of the protection of young industries,
was included in the discussion just above. It was mentioned,
however, more in connection with those industries which at
various times and for various reasons are caused to appear
as essential to the welfare of the nation. The application
of this theory has been extended in recent times to cover
just about any commodity a man might decide he would like
to make. Furthermore this exception to unrestricted trade
has long been known as the "young industries" or the "infant
industries" argument. To apply it to any industries that
people may choose to start, by means of protective duties, is
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quite apart from the original meaning. We should go back
to Mr. Mill for the exact significance.
M The only case in which, on principles of
political economy, protecting duties can be defen-
sible, is when they are imposed temporarily (es-
pecially in a young and rising nation) in hopes of
naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself per-
fectly suited to the circumstances of the country.
The superiority of one country over another in
a branch of production often arises only from
having begun it sooner. There may be no inherent
advantage on one part, or disadvantage on the
other, but only a present superiority of acquired
skill and experience.... But the protection
should be confined to cases in which there is
good ground of assurance that the industry which
it fosters will after a time be able to dispense
with it; nor should the domestic producers ever
be allowed to expect that it will be continued
to them beyond the time necessary for a fair .„
trial of what they are capable of accomplishing."
In actual practice industries nurtured in this
manner have certainly expected the protection to continue.
The pleas advanced gradually change to the need of protect-
ing employees and the investments that have come to depend
upon the continuance of the industry, A strong public
sentiment favorable to the system has been secured through
the workers who are taught to fear foreign competition.
Many arguments are used in this kind of indoctrination that
are specious or only half truths. M It was a young country
that was spoken of by Mill, rather than one having young
14
industries." When does a country cease to be young?
And in a country no longer young, when does an industry new
to the country cease to be young? These have proved to be
13. Mill, PPE, II, 538-9.
14. Taussig, SAT, 20.
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questions difficult to answer. It is pleasant to rest in
security, and others are attracted as the beginners grow
and prosper. Is the labor and capital thus drawn from
other activity being employed as effectively as it might
be in something else?
It is plain that the use of tariffs is the most
significant trend in the development of new industries to-
day in all nations, regardless of the age of the country.
The principle has found ready acceptance in an ever widening
circle; to make easier "any period of transition and great
15
industrial change"; and to develop the production of all
goods that are essential in time of war. The claim is
unblushingly made that about everything is necessary to a
nation involved in war. When this point is reached it is
not possible to maintain protection for them all without
continuing many at an economic disadvantage against the
public interest.
At the enactment of the last American tariff re-
vision, that of 1930, Oswald Garrison Villard, Editor of
"The Nation", spoke out with feeling against this feature
of the legislation. In part he said:
"Whenever Congress votes a protective
tariff it puts the government into partnership
with the producers in that industry, whether they
are manufacturers in Connecticut, or wool-growers
in Wyoming. When the government, through Congress,
fixes a tariff for a business it regulates the prof-
its of that industry, thus becoming a partner in
the industry, and a most influential partner, since
it guarantees the profits. Under our system of
15. Taussig, SAT, 21.
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tariff-making, it guarantees profits to industries
whether they are weak or strong, old or new, honest
or corrupt in their management, efficient or in-
efficient, necessary or unnecessary. " 16
International Amity
Governments have always maintained the right to
dictate the terms under which they were willing to trade with
others. But some countries are rich and others poor in the
possession of basic materials. The rich have tended, during
the last thirty years especially, to increase production and
reach out for wider markets; the poor to attain greater se-
curity through more effective use of what materials they
were able to purchase from the rich. Increasing economic
interdependence is the outstanding trend which seems des-
tined to continue, despite the persistent opposing trend
since the war towards unfriendly trade relations. A phi-
losophy of mutual gain is accepted in domestic exchange re-
lations. No permanent prosperity is expected by a pro-
ducer unless he and his product favorably impresses the po-
tential purchaser, who will certainly trade with another
producer if his antagonism is openly courted by acts and
manners of the first producer. Nothing is done with the
intention of depriving the consumer of his means of pros-
pering. But in trade between nations it is otherwise;
some frankly expect to prosper at the expense of others
and a fairly militant terminology is constantly employed.
Trade war, tariff war, a weapon for retaliation, the con-
16. Johnsen, FT, 110.
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quest of markets, trade invasion, tariff walls in defense
against foreign aggression - these terms do not impress
by the friendly spirit back of them.
These opposing tendencies and their constant
threat to international amity are discussed further in the
succeeding chapters of this study, under which heads they
have manifested themselves most strikingly in recent years.
aanolab at all^ llita.* ,noia£vni ebsiS f a^s>Iix5» lo Jaeup
aaa^rel J- on ob 6*1*4 93arf,t - nol3adi&a fl nalsTol Janijeae
.ia&d^ "io >{OBd Jiiiqa vlbneill edi
JnjsJ"2noo lia.id" bnj& aatonabna;* ^niaoqqo tJ^eriT
,r sflJ sbt:ari rfoiiiw is-bnu 7bi/.ta siriS "io sT3jQflfio ^nibasoox/8
CHAPTER II.
THE TREND IN EUROPE
General Trade Situation
By the year 1900 certain European countries,
notably England, France, and Germany, were well advanced
in a system of industrial specialization. Not along dif-
ferent lines according to special advantages for some
particular type of production, but all of them along gen-
eral lines that are similar. Without exception they
aimed to develop and increase their production of textile
1
goods and products of iron and steel. As they all applied
the new machine technique, it was to competing rather than
to complementary ^oods, causing an intense competition
among themselves for possession of any world markets that
still remained open to economic penetration - to employ one
of the phrases suggestive of the militant attitude which
this trend fosters. An increasing conflict of interests
in the wider markets which become essential to the large
manufacturing nations under a high degree of specializa-
tion, generated an Economic Imperialism with war constant-
2
ly in the background.
For the smaller nations of Europe there exist no
special advantages in the matter of large-scale industrial
specialization; with them the trend has been the same but
1. Cole, GWC, 320.
2. Ibid. , 319.
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they cannot hope to develop a national self-sufficiency
which even approaches that of the larger nations. Without
more ready access to world supplies of certain of the raw
materials that are essential to industrial development, the
economic subjugation of the weak by the strong is likely to
continue
.
In general, Europe had no serious competition as
the chief supplier of manufactures until the years following
the World War, with its resulting dislocation of trade. It
is true, however that her economic position had been grad-
ually weakening since the beginning of the century, primari-
ly because of the advances being made by other countries;
her share in the trade of the world distinctly was declin-
3
ing. Inevitably, wealth, power, and productive capacity were
growing in other lands, to whose development Europe has been
the chief contributor.
A comparison of the trade relations of Europe with
the United States, the richest and most desirable market, is
illuminating. In the year 1900 the United States sent 75
per cent of her total exports to Europe while in 1929 the
figure was less than 45 per cent. In 1900 the United States
took from Europe 52 per cent of her total imports, but in
4
1989 only 30 per cent. Without doubt much of this loss
was due to the war; lost markets, the regaining of which
represents a difficult struggle. America is now quite able
3. Boucke, EAT, 40.
4. Ibid. , 41.
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to supply, for her own market and for export, the type of
specialty which Europe now must export. "Manufactures in
final form constitute a most important part of all ex-
ports in Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, the United
5
Kingdom, and Belgium."
In order to maintain this type of exporting, vast
quantities of staple raw materials have to be imported even
though, taken as a whole, her natural resources in this re-
spect are great. And the home consumer market would be
relatively great if it were possible to take it as a whole.
With each country making a vigorous attempt to be the sole
supplier of its own markets, to think of Europe as one
market is to invite ridicule. It seems as though modern
specialization will require larger economic units in order
to secure the possible comparative advantages. Surely all
historical and racial tradition is against a political union
of European states. How to reconcile and adjust the rela-
tionships of an economic union and maintain the animosities,
fears, and suspicions, appears to be a major problem. The
needs of many of the smaller nations, if they are to achieve
any measure of industrialization, are greater than the needs
of others. The many small countries struggling to attain
economic independence and security behind high tariff bar-
riers are at a decided disadvantage and constitute a menace
6
to peace.
5. Boucke, EAT, 21.
6. Cole, GWC, 320.
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Tariff Relationships
General European tariff relationships during the
decade preceding the World War had grown to be widespread
7
protection, tempered by commercial treaties. For many
years colonial expansion had been the outstanding charac-
teristic, in the course of which most of the world still
free from foreign domination had been partitioned among
the commercial leaders of Europe. Economically the prin-
ciple back of this stood for the free importation of raw
materials along with heavy duties on manufactured goods
which would offer competition to domestic industries. It
can be said of this period that goods were exchanged with
a fair degree of freedom amid peaceful economic conditions.
To be sure many high tariffs had been established, but as
high pressure spots appeared they were definitely eased by
the application of bi-lateral treaties covering a wide
range of specific commodities. It was almost universal
practice to include in the commercial treaties of this
period the unconditional most-favored-nation clause. A
great deal of tariff levelling is accomplished if each im-
portant trading nation negotiates only a few treaties with
this clause as a basic factor. The unconditional inter-
pretation spread any advantages agreed upon between two
nations, to all other nations with which agreements existed
at the time.
7. Delle-Donne, ETP, 3.
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All of the trade advantages that were being real-
ized through a system of commercial treaties came to an
end with the war, at which time the treaties were auto-
matically abrogated. Without exception the countries re-
sorted to a system of strict control over domestic and
foreign commerce, adopting a sweeping schedule of import
and export regulations. Tremendous sacrifices were made
and losses suffered, leaving a Europe economically pros-
trate. Nothing could be done over the peace table to re-
store the appalling loss of human lives, but all people
hoped for a resolution of the rivalries, discords, and
hatreds that had previously torn these nations; hoped for
a recognition of their dire need of a united and friendly
effort to re-build.
One of President Wilson* s famous fourteen points
called attention to trade barriers in general with the
8
following words :
"The removal, so far as possible, of all
economic barriers and the establishment of an equal-
ity of trade conditions among all nations consenting
to the peace and associating themselves for its
maintenance.
"
Mr. Wilson was not alone in his vision of such a need in
order to salvage a commerce vital to all countries, whether
directly involved in the conflict or not. It seemed sane
and reasonable as well as necessary. Had the terrific
struggle not welded the people together in a community of
interest and brought into vivid relief the futility of
8. Johnsen, FT, 3.
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destroying so much that they had labored to create? It
was clear, however, before the peace conference assem-
bled that ideals of this kind were not to prevail; the
vision of more friendly and tolerant relations was
only an illusion. Traditional animosities revived
with extreme rapidity, bringing from the peace table a
document that was far from an ideal of international
amity.
The interests of industrial and commercial
groups have ruled the international policies of Europe
since the war, which left in its wake a spirit of
passionate nationalism which has been expressed largely
9
in economic terms. The period has been marked by the
raising and the multiplication of tariff walls with a
system of import and export restrictions which make the
movement of goods very difficult. The creation of a
number of new political units by the Versailles treaty,
without regard for natural economic units, has operated
to intensify the situation. An indication of the trend
in Europe during the comparatively short period between
1925 and 1929 is given in the following table:
9. Delle-Donne, ETP, 82.
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THE RISE OF EUROPEAN TARIFFS*
ESTIMATED- LEVEL OF TARIFF DUTIES
- '
1
' i
! (per cent, of duties to value of imports) Rise *
1925 1929 1925-1929 ':
: Austria : 12 14 17 ':
: Belgium ! 8 ! 12 50 i
: Denmark : 6 : 10 ; 67 :
: France : 12 : 16 1/2 ! 38 !
: Germany 12 : 15 1/2 : 29 ':
: Holland
;
4 j: 8 1/2 < 112 \
: Great Britain : 4 8 1/2 : 112 :
Increases since the year 1929 have been very
significant and actual tariff increases would not tell the
whole story. The effect on international trade of the
barriers other than tariffs is extremely important. Import
and export quotas, embargoes, and exchange restrictions, dur-
ing the last three years have doubtless operated to restrain
the flow of trade quite as much as the tariffs.
In the following pages the trend in certain specific
countries will be examined in relation to their comparative
advantages and disadvantages.
* Figures from Cole, GWC, 331
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CHAPTER III
THE SITUATION IN GREAT BRITAIN ,
FRANCE, GERMANY, and ITALY
Great Britain
In the matter of trading policy, Great Britain
is often indicated as the outstanding exception to the
rule of treaty-adjusted protection. From about the year
1850 to the post-war dislocations, this preeminent in-
dustrial and capitalist leader was M the staunchest advo-
cate of Free Trade and the great country most dependent
1
on external commerce for the means of life". Great
Britain had known protective duties in earlier days with
agriculture predominating and with industries in their
early growth. Under a policy of protection, British
industries developed with amazing rapidity while agri-
culture steadily declined. Although this specialized
industrial development was also characteristic of vari-
ous other European nations, certain special advantages
which attended the development of British manufactures,
"succeeded in so increasing their productive power as to
surpass all other countries , both in quantity and cheapness
2
of production". The time arrived, of course, when
English production, enjoying a safe and comfortable lead,
no longer needed protection. Rather than to defend them-
1. Cole, GWC, 342.
2. Delle-Donne, ETP, 5.
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selves against competition from others. English producers
needed to find more and more purchasers for their goods.
Duties were abandoned and England^ trade with the con-
tinent expanded as did her colonial influence.
Thus it is clear that Great Britain gradually-
turned to freedom of trade in order to secure a balanced
economy, no longer possible within her own borders. Manu-
factures would be supplied to an ever widening market in
return for increased supplies of raw materials and food-
stuffs; an ideal combination as long as a balance could be
maintained. Producers themselves were the strongest ad-
herents to free trade at first, but the emphasis gradually
shifted to the consumers as the main body of the population
came to believe that in the principle was their manifest
destiny. Leaders of industry retained their faith in free
trade as long as their productive efficiency remained
superior to that of the foreigner and there was no fear
3
of his competition.
Right up to the war her exports were expanding,
even though some markets were lost to other rising indus-
trial nations. New markets were being opened as others
were lost. But the very fact that foreign competition
was now able to gain the lead in spots, indicated that the
margin of productive efficiency, hitherto in favor of
Great Britain, was being narrowed with the progressive in-
4
dustrialization of other countries. For some years be-
3. Cole, ETT, 66.
4. Ibid.
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fore the war there existed a movement for tariff reform
always in the background, "often mingled with the demand
for an extensive system of Empire preference, in order to
build up the British Empire into an effective economic
5
unit". Very recently, at Ottawa, a determined effort
was made to establish a definite system of Empire preference
Although not widely heralded as an outstanding success, the
conference at Ottawa was significant, as the beginning of
a British lapse into economic nationalism is significant.
More will be said later of Ottawa and Empire preference.
It took an emergency to shake the foundations of
British free trade and to establish anything like a general
demand for protection; unmistakably the World War provided
such an emergency. No other fighting country was so depend-
ent on imports of primary goods and both sides of the
tariff question recognized the need of emergency measures.
Thus the path for a protectionist revival was made compara-
tively smooth. Among the first restrictions were discrimi-
nations against any goods from enemy countries. Then came
the necessity, as in the other industrial countries, of
attempting to maintain the industries newly created or
greatly extended by the emergency, and those considered
to be "key" industries, "not because of their economic im-
portance but because they are considered necessary for the
6
country* s safety and defense in time of war".
5. Cole, GWC, 342.
6. Delle-Donne, STP, 262.
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When in the year 1926 an actual protective act
was passed, it was widely held that Great Britian had com-
pletely succumbed to nationalist protection. The range
of commodities covered, however, by The Safeguarding of
Industries Act was rather narrow, since it included duties
7
on only one- tenth of one per cent, of total imports. To
any attempts to apply further tariff duties until the
general world crisis of 1929, British public opinion was
consistently hostile. At this point export losses and
decreased incomes from investments and services, threatened
her international balance of payments. Some brake had to
be applied to imports since the means of paying for them
was disappearing. The widespread raising of tariffs in
other countries at this time, under the prevailing post-
war spirit of nationalism and panic fears, did much to
force changes in Great Britain. There is now in force a
full measure of protection, as a result of acts passed in
1931 and 1932, against practically all manufactured goods
and a considerable number of raw materials and foodstuffs;
8
of the last named, wheat is one of the most vital.
It is quite possible that Great Britain will
never again be able to export such a large portion of her
productive capacity, considering the progressive indus-
trialization of other countries. In which case various
adjustments in her industries will be required, in the
7. Delle-Donne, ETP, 262.
8. Cole, GWC, 345.
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planning and execution of which, certain trade restrictions
may have to be maintained. It is also quite possible that
other methods than prohibitive tariffs can be devised to
better advantage. Apart from the general economic depres-
sion now choking all international exchanges, her particu-
lar needs would be much the same as in the past and her
new orgy of nationalism serves to illustrate the opposing
trends with which this study is particularly concerned.
It is unlikely that Great Britain has lost normal trade
in proportion to the severity of the restrictions now
imposed. Temporarily a like volume of trade unquestion-
ably has been lost; it does not exist at the moment for
anybody, but in order to restore it, restrictions are
frantically applied. With an economic structure so en-
tirely dependent on foreign trade, her present tariff
policy indicates the paradox more strikingly than any of
the other nations.
France
A study of the tariff trend in France discloses
a consistent policy of rigid protection, before the war
primarily of the agricultural interests and since the
war of the industrial interests as well. Conflicting
trends are not so sharply defined in the case of France,
in fact do not stand out at all until the post-war period
is taken into consideration. During this period she
sought to foster the development of certain industries in
T6 JlJ O
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which the war caused great expansion, notably the produc-
tion of chemicals, dyes, and iron and steel goods.
More than the usual post-war significance attaches
to the rapid progress of French industries. They are con-
centrated along the northern border near natural resources
of coal, iron ore and oil. Furthermore, by far the closest
industrial concentration exists in the Alsace-Lorraine
10
area, recovered by France as part of the peace. Here is
located the entire chemical industry, most of the iron and
steel, and a large part of the textile production. This
fairly sudden industrial acquisition is plainly reflected
in the table on page 33, which indicates a steady decline
in French imports of manufactured goods with an impressive
increase in their exports. It is difficult to say how
much of this trade expansion has been due to tariff pro-
tection.
"There has been a thorough reconstruc-
tion of practically the entire range of indus-
tries in the devastated regions. It is certain,
however, that without increased protection the
work of reconstruction and reorganization would
have been much more difficult and the resumption
of full industrial activity much delayed." J-l
We find Great Britain making a very significant
reversal of a long established policy of unrestricted
trading, which has served her well. The extent of her
reversal appears to be unwarranted in view of her own
most vital interests. France, however, returns to a
9. Delle-Donne, ETP, 173.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. , 174.
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COMPOSITION OF FRENCH FOREIGN TRADE
(value in million francs)
: IMPORTS EXPORTS :
A B : C : A B : C :
:1913 : 6,734 : 1.658 : 20 : 2.697
:
3 .6i7 57 :
1920 ; 37,032 : 12.873 26 : 8,727 • 16,963 66 :
1921 ! 17,157 : 4,910 22 : 6,163 ; 12.356 67 :
1922 : 19,878 4,051 17 7.689 12,272 62 :
,1923 : 28,312 4,376 14 ; 12.533 16.239
!
56 :
1924 : 34,835 5,092 13 : 14,521 24.883 63 :
1925 : 38.578 5,402 : 12 : 16,189 ! 26.976 63 :
1926 : 51.945 : 7,570 : 12 : 21,745 I 37,790 i 64 :
A - Raw Materials, food and drink combined.
(Approximately 70 - 80 per cent, raw materials)
B - Manufactured goods.
C - Per cent, of manufactured goods to totals.
Table adapted from figures in Delle-Donne, ETP, 172-3.
_WO 1 3HOT qOM3fH .IP,
(soaail noiXXim nl
" """*
'
-
i
A
•
r
sae.ax ! JDS6 Li
: Vd « ! xsex!
• ^ t*? *2 r
;
VX.
! co ; cos , *- i. ; »c>p » ^*
i 88 • ... „-.t- ~ ;
esx.ax : SX
* r,a i oev.vs
' 3*V,XS j ove.v 1 eMM5
(eXj3^9.t£:;i ieq OS -
t
9xinod-*XXw*'
system of rigid tariff protection after a period of strict
war-time prohibitions, which begins to oppose the main
European industrial trend only in recent years with the
undeniable expansion of her competing manufacturing trades.
Both through those recovered and those reconstructed,
France enters the struggle for foreign markets with partic-
ular energy, for in both instances, the industries in ques-
tion are highly developed and highly specialized in the
modern productive trend.
A further point to consider in regard to the
French competitive duties arises from the fact that France
always has been primarily an agricultural nation, in fact
the agricultural interests still constitute the most power-
ful of all of the economic interests in the country,
"The annual value of agricultural produc-
tion (vegetal and animal) was estimated in 1921 to
be 42 billion francs, that is, more than half the
total income of the country. Unlike all other
large agricultural countries, such as the United
States, Argentina, and Canada, France exports only
a small part of her produce, the French agricul-
tural production being chiefly destined for domes-
tic consumption." 12
It is not difficult to understand her tradition-
al policy of protection of the domestic market as long as
she was producing primarily for that market, nor the later
and present policy of negotiating commercial treaties with
individual nations as a basis for trading as soon as a
surplus for exporting is produced. There is no better
12. Delle-Donne, ETP, 162.
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example than France of the general European situation that
was suggested at the beginning of Chapter II; that is,
high protection tempered with commercial treaties. She
has been a consistent exponent of tariff schedules with
minimum and maximum rates; the minimum rates to be used
in reciprocal tariff bargaining. This general trade
philosophy is now typical of the countries of continental
Europe, in truth it can now be said, of all Europe; England
with her new system of high duties is rapidly heading into
the same reasoning. The method, and its basic reasoning,
is devised largely on the assumption that inequality and
discriminations are necessary features of trade bargaining
between countries. The system that has grown up through-
out Europe involves schedules of rates based, not so much
on economic needs as on their value as bargaining instru-
13
ment s.
One of the most prominent characteristics of
European tariffs during the post-war years has been the
persistent negotiation of these trade agreements, smoothing
out difficulties strictly on a reciprocal basis. A great
many were in operation at the outbreak of the war, at
which time they were automatically cancelled, hence the
particular activity in the immediate years following.
Tariffs have to exist if they are to be used in this kind
of bargaining, but certainly the system tends to prevent
excessively high rates on some goods and in some cases.
13. Stuart, Annals
,
Jan., 1929, 98.
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Adaed revenues have been urgently needed during the recon-
struction years; in fact any study of customs duties nor-
mally would give the revenue side of the question major
consideration. But it is quite obvious that when duties
become prohibitory there is no consideration being given
to revenue. The more treaties that France concludes ac-
cording minimum or intermediate rates on long schedules
of commodities, the more revenue and trade will ensue, inas-
much as the method is predicated on the desire and expec-
tancy of trade.
Franco-Amer i can trade improvement continues to be
a baffling problem; the following figures indicate its
14
trend
:
TRADE OF FRANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES
(in millions of dollars)
1910-14 1921-25
.
1925 1926 1927 :
i Imports ; 138 ! 265
;
280 264 ; 228
iExports : 130 147
;
157 152 167 ;
Excess
Imports 8 118 123 112 61
It is with difficulty that France has been able to
meet payments for the excess of imports so clearly indicated
in the above figures, the relatively high United States du-
ties on many French specialties acting to restrict mutual
exchanges. The French principle of concluding separate
14. Enslow, Annals
,
Jan. 1929, 214. Adapted.
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treaties in which her minimum rates are accorded in return
for definite concessions, conflicts with the American prin-
ciple of equal treatment to all. Americans appear to be
greatly disturbed by the fact that France finally caused
her maximum rates, considerably raised, to apply to Ameri-
can goods; and still later, after long and unsatisfactory
negotiations for a mutual concession agreement, discrimi-
nated further by applying a system of quotas against Araer-
15
ican goods. That these maximum rates were considerably
higher than formerly may be judged from the fact that in
the year 1921 they were raised to nearly four times the
16
height of the minimum rates. At this time her low rates
were expressly denied to American manufactures, after
allowing their application for several years without any
actual trade agreement, "in the hope of securing some
17
favorable treatment for French products". All attempts
failed and have continued to fail primarily because the
American interpretation of trade arrangements does not
envisage reciprocity; it contends that the only policy
which prevents international misunderstandings is to be
found in the equal treatment for the trade of all nations.
The American interpretation sounds as though it would
supply a better and fairer basis for satisfactory rela-
tions of a permanent nature, but in fact is not producing
an adequate solution of the commercial problems which con-
15. Enslow, Annals, Jan.
,
1929, 212.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.

front the country. As long as industrial specialization
in similar products continues, it would seem necessary to
bargain through making definite concessions, and various
comparative advantages are likely to require various kinds
of concessions.
French tariffs are now high, much higher than
they were before the war, and intricate to apply because
of her three rate schedules. Her extremely high maximum
rates, where they operate in the absence of treaties, tend
to become prohibitive, but reduce the level in no small
degree in the presence of treaties.
Germany
What has already been said regarding the Euro-
pean scramble for foreign markets in which to trade the
products of an extremely virile industrial expansion,
applies particularly to Germany during the pre-war years.
Germany's effort to overcome all competition was deter-
mined, skilful, well organized^ and eminently successful;
an effort which was successful in the creation of the
leading industrial and commercial nation of Continental
18
Europe. Rigid tariff protection of the domestic market
was in force during this period together with a rather
complete system of commercial treaties.
Whether for good or for ill, the Treaty of Ver-
18. Delle-Donne, ETP, 193.
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sailles stripped Germany of all economic power.
"Examining closely the economic and finan-
cial clauses of the Treaty of Peace, one easily
arrives at the conclusion that its sole aim was to
place Germany in a state of economic dissolution
and to prevent her from resuming her former place
in international trade. The destruction of her
basic industries, the dismemberment of her terri-
tory, the dislocation of her productive power, the
shattering of her vast economic organization, and
the absolute exclusion of Germany from foreign
markets - these were, in brief, the means employed
to achieve that purpose. The Allies did not fear
a Germany economically strong within its own bor-
ders so much as the prospect of their former ene-
my^ fierce competition in foreign markets." I9
The "absolute exclusion from foreign markets" was
accomplished not only by an appropriation of German colo-
nies, but by direct refusals to trade with the enemy coun-
try through the use of extreme prohibitions. Moreover,
Germany was not allowed to place any restrictions on
Allied products, rather she must continue to receive them
on her pre-war trade basis. How she was to pay for them
was a question to which the treaty-framers did not address
themselves, and reveals the spirit prevailing at their de-
liberations. That the spirit was at variance with their
paramount obligation to frame a foundation for political
and economic stabilization, is clear enough now, if not
clear then.
As soon as the trade clauses of the treaty ex-
pired, that is, in the year 1925, Germany raised the level
of her tariffs in order to be more in accord with those
19. Delle-Donne, STP, 192.
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countries with which she must trade. Not only had markets
been lost in the ordinary course of war conditions, but
also they had been openly barred to her by the Allies
while they avidly bargained for recovery of the trade.
Here again appears the paradox of a struggle to regain com-
mercial relations, the first move of which was to raise
barriers against them. But there seemed to be no other
way to correct an adverse balance of payments except to
reduce imports; to sell more goods abroad without buying
any more. The importation of certain goods was entirely
prohibited and Germany, as well as the other manufacturing
countries, sought to replace imports by domestic products
without selling less abroad. That Germany succeeded in
doing this to a surprising extent is indicated by the
table on page 41. It is notable that a formidable excess
of imports was reversed to an equally formidable excess of
exports during years of a world economic depression. The
policy brought its difficulties in all countries, and espe-
cially acute difficulties in Germany in view of an extra
burden of reparations payments to which she was committed.
"The scope of international trade grew narrower and narrow-
er; and everywhere the result of the strangle hold on eco-
nomic intercourse was seen in an alarming increase of un-
20
employment.
"
While it would be absurd to say that high tariffs
and other import restrictions reduced Germany to a state of
20. Cole, GWC, 81.
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41.
GERMANY'S FOREIGN TRADE, 1927-1931""
| (in millions of Reichsmarks) \
\ monthly averages \
Net Imports
:
Net Exports : Net Balance :
!l927 1186 852 -334 :
!l928 1167 968 : -199 :
•1929 1121 1055 - 66 :
:
1930 866 944 + 78 :
•1931 561 767 +206 :
Figures taken from Cole, GVVC, 68.
1:
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chaos, they constituted a major factor in the highly arti-
ficial policy of trade stimulus which was certain to col-
lapse if protracted very long. German producers were
driven to cut prices in an effort to undersell their com-
petitors abroad, and this was accomplished through lower
wages and higher prices at home. In the event of a rapid
world recovery, it is conceivable that disaster could have
been avoided. Instead of recovery, there followed a devas-
tating depreciation of foreign currencies and a general
collapse of monetary and commodity exchanges,
Italy
This country represents another example of one
traditionally agricultural, but straining every nerve, dur-
ing the last fifty years or so, to furnish the home market
manufactured goods made at home. Nearly every important
industry is now represented on the Italian list, and the
creation has been achieved under a more serious handicap
in regard to natural resources of raw materials than any
country yet discussed. "Even today Italy depends to a
very large extent on foreign supplies of materials essen-
tial to her industries. She imports more than 80 per cent
of her annual coal consumption; more than 70 per cent of
her iron-ore requirements; 75 per cent of her wool con-
sumption; and almost the entire supply of cotton, petro-
leum, mineral oils, jute, rubber, and cellulose." 21
21. Delle-Donne, ETP, 242.
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Even with such a poverty of raw materials, Ital-
ian industry has progressed extremely well. Steady im-
provement has been recorded from the war to the world de-
pression with high protective tariffs at all times to com-
pensate for raw material disadvantages. A study of Ital-
ian tariff policies, therefore, reveals no change from in-
dustrial protection, and no change appears possible as
long as it is deemed necessary to manufacture the goods
desired by her people. There are few lines in which she
can hope to produce at a comparative advantage.
Furthermore, as other nations, to which Italy
must look for her customers, continue their concentration
on the production of similar types of goods, her trade
must suffer. It is not sufficient only to satisfy the
domestic requirements, since something must be sold in
order to pay for heavy imports. In fact a heavy, and in-
creasing, excess of imports does characterize the trade of
22
Italy; a fact that is causing no little concern. Although
for years there has been an excess of commodity imports, an
adverse balance of payments has not always followed. Tour-
ist expenditures within the country, remittances from Ital-
ian emigrants, and service earnings have tended to balance
23
her international account during certain years.
When the United States enacted legislation to re-
strict immigrants, trade with Italy received a serious blow.
22. Delle-Donne, ETP, 251.
23. Ibid. , 256.
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Each year Italian remittances equalled tourist expenditures,
and frequently exceeded them, as a means of paying for the
goods bought from the United States. After the war the
United States replaced Germany as Italy's chief supplier
but has proved to be a comparatively poor customer. In
recent years Italy has been able to sell to the United
States less than a third in value of her purchases, large-
ly because of prohibitive American duties on her goods, in
addition to quarantine restrictions against many of the
24
Italian agricultural products. A very satisfactory basis
of trade existed with Germany; an exchange of Italian agri-
cultural products for German manufactures. Trade difficul-
ties with the United States would seem to be gradually re-
turning Germany to her old position in Italian trade. This
is possible to accomplish through treaty concessions, de-
spite the competing nature of their industrial development.
Italy and France have been forced to rely more and
more, in recent years, on tourist expenditures to pay for
their American purchases. As they sell to the Americans
the services of their railways, hotels, museums, and pleas-
ure resorts, an increasing number of their people are drawn
into such services and away from other productive types of
employment. In the process, it is a question whether or not
25
their labor is thus more effectively employed. American
tariffs on their merchandise play an important part in this
24. Delle-Donne, ETP, 252.
25. Roorback, Annals, Jan., 1S29, 27.
Jti
shifting of the responsibility for payment from the indus-
trialist to the service vendor, although other factors have
been present. It is possible that in the necessary inter-
nal adjustments, the economic gains to the Europeans may
offset the economic losses. The resentment and general
ill-will aroused, however, are not assets in commercial
26
relations.
26. Roorback, Annals, Jan., 1929, 29.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SITUATION IN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA
Canada
Although very decidedly in the group of countries
which are principally exporters of foodstuffs and raw ma-
terials, Canada is also among "those which are capable
within the predictable future of developing large-scale
1
manufactures of their own". At the same time Canada is
unique in her dependence on the world market for a single
crop; she grows the world's largest exportable surplus of
2
wheat.
This fact alone would not cause Canada to have a
tariff policy of any significance; she would exchange her
wheat for the manufactured goods made by her customers.
And this does actually happen insofar as Canada has not
yet developed certain manufactures for her own market.
Here again is a country making every effort to create a
more balanced economy. There are various factors which
combine to force the conclusion that many industrial com-
modities demanded by Canadians will not be made at home
even with the highest tariff protection and stimulation.
"Limited by the character of her climate, soil, and natural
resources, and by the sparseness of population, to compara-
tively few exporting industries, she must with the products
of these industries pay for the commodities of other coun-
1. Cole, GV/C, 321.
2. Ibid., 300.
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tries which she cannot, or cannot profitably, produce for
3
herself, but which she insists on having." Canada's in-
dustries must remain very dependent on foreign trade, re-
quiring the importation of a long list of essential raw
materials, among which are all textile fibers, copper,
4
coal and iron ore.
Despite these apparent disadvantages, Canada,
with a growing population now of about ten millions, has
become one of the leading nations in world trade and fifth
5
in the standing of manufacturing nations. Just above,
Mr. Cole is quoted as predicting a Canadian future char-
acterized by large-scale manufacturing, while Mr. Viner
recounts certain very definite checks on such a develop-
ment. Both men are able students of modern economic trends.
It is probable that the two positions may be reconciled,
providing they are both somewhat correct, by a closer study
of the particular industries which are likely to be stimu-
lated far enough to produce surpluses for export. In other
words there will probably be no serious attempt to press
the development of those industries which prove to be par-
ticularly unprofitable.
Especially during the period of this study,
Canada steadily expanded its manufacturing establishments,
largely with the aid of borrowed British capital. "There
3. Viner, CBI, 12.
4. Ibid.
5. Marvin, Annals, Jan. 1929, 227.
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resulted a gradual shift in the character of its imports
from finished manufactured commodities to raw materials,
6
machinery and equipment, and partly-manufactured goods."
Great Britain was at a disadvantage as a supplier of these
goods, with the result that British capital was used to
7
purchase American goods.
Other agricultural countries, seeking to estab-
lish manufacturing within their borders, have usually re-
sorted to high tariffs, apart from the raw materials which
they happen to need; and Canada is no exception to this
rule. Many things Canadian, follow tastes and styles pre-
vailing in the United States, but the country followed
Europe in its selection of a tariff style. A multiple
tariff, several forms of which exist throughout the list
of nations which are definitely protectionist, was adopted
and used effectively by Canada in a series of commercial
treaties of the European type. Devised for effective bar-
gaining, her "preferential" system differs from those of
Continental Europe in this way: "it establishes by its own
legislation a regime of special treatment in favor of an-
8
other or others." Instead of two distinct rates, the
Canadian system requires three; a general, an intermediate,
and a British preferential schedule. The general rate
applies to the imports from all countries not entitled by
law or commercial agreement to special treatment. The
6. Viner, CBI , 289.
7. Ibid., 288.
8. U.S. Tariff Commission, RCT, 505.
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intermediate rate is for treaty negotiations, and the final
9
rate for British goods.
Imperial Preference
Great Britain has long cherished the idea of an
effective system of Empire preference with its approach to
a large self-sufficient economic unit. Sentimental reasons
are not strong enough and practically she seems unable to
offer sufficient inducements. Her approach, of course, has
been from the premise of free trade in which the Dominions
are not particularly interested. To this, New Zealand is
an exception more completely dependent on Great Britain in
10
the matter of both exports and imports. Great Britain
cannot agree to take Canada's entire wheat surplus for she
does not consume that much; and the persistent course of
the Canadian industrial development comes into direct con-
flict with the British industrial specialties. The Dominion
tariffs aim to exclude British as well as foreign goods that
compete with the home industries. To this end even the
Dominion preferential rates continue to give their own
11
products an advantage.
Although comparative statistics are lacking to
show the actual effectiveness of Empire preference, the
9. U.S. Tariff Commission, RCT, 505.
10. Cole, GWC, 327.
11. Young, Annals
,
Jan.
,
1929, 205.

50
tables reproduced on page 51, indicate that it may be very
material. From these figures it is clear that the more
important Empire units are the less dependent on the Empire
in their trade, and it is these units which tend more and
more to seek markets outside of the Empire. However, it is
seen from the table of comparative tariff levels that India
is the only major division which fails to give a substan-
tial advantage to Empire products. The background of a
closer union already exists, but the trend of their develop-
ment carries them further apart; two major efforts working
at cross purposes. The most recent attempt to strengthen
their union and one that is not without significance -
the Ottawa Conference - will be discussed in a separate
chapter on the economic conferences held during the years
following the World War.
Latin America
The trend of increasing tariff protection so far
observed, is not characteristic of the Latin American coun-
tries. Tariffs here are primarily for revenue, although in
recent years Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have introduced a
12
few schedules for the protection of new industries. In
such cases as now exist, rates do not prohibit importation,
inasmuch as production is not sufficient for home consump-
tion and the duties operate to increase the domestic price
12. Thompson, Annals . Jan. 1929, 234.
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INDEXES OF TARIFF LEVELS
IN MAJOR DIVISIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
(ad valorem per cent.
)
On British
Goods
; On Foreign ;
Goods
:Aus tralia 9.8 21.5 ;'
:Canada : 13.3 18.3 to 21.5 \
•India 10.5 10. 5 ':
:New Zealand 8.5 j 20.5
.-Union of So. Africa 9.0 11.8 ;
VOLUME OF BRITISH EMPIRE TRADE
: (per cent, of total imports and exports) :
•
»
: Imports from
Empire
: Exports to :
Empire
;
:Australia 56.5 52.8
;
:Canada 20.7 ! 43.2 !
: India 50.5 24.8 :'
:New Zealand 71.4 86.7 ':
:Union of So. Africa 62.4 79.6
:United Kingdom 26.9 42.6
Figures from Young, Annals
,
Jan. 1929, 208-9.
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13
of the goods in question. Still, it is important to
notice that even in these countries which are very far be-
hind economically and politically, an industrial beginning
has been made. The future of these countries will probably
supply expanding markets for the products of the heavy in-
dustries; a field in which the Latin American countries are
unlikely to advance in view of their total lack of coal and
iron resources. They will tend to export more of their
14
primary products in the form of semi-manufactures.
The tariff and trade policies of the United States
and Great Britain are certain to have a significant bearing
on the economic future of these countries as indeed they
have in the past. Both are in a position to supply Latin
America with heavy industrial products and capital funds,
or rather to continue to supply them. Great Britain has
the advantage in an important section of this market by
virtue of a natural, friendly, and thriving trade devel-
oped over the last few decades. During this time the
United States has been particularly interested only in
those countries the products of which were much needed;
notably, Brazil for its coffee, and Cuba for its sugar.
In fact it is true that the European industrial nations as
a whole secured an early foothold in the Latin American
markets, while the United States was still importing capi-
tal.
13. Thompson, Annals
,
Jan. 1929, 234.
14. Cole, GWC, 322.
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Great Britain's main advantage lies in a very
profitable trade with Argentina, the most important trad-
ing republic of the group. Argentina's meat and grains
are exchanged freely for British manufactures with a bal-
15
ance favorable to Argentina. Some difficulty with the
freedom of this trade may be anticipated because of the
British shift to protected nationalism in which even her
essential foodstuffs are coming in for duties. Any ex-
tension of Empire preferences is certain to raise ques-
tions of comparative treatment in trade agreements which
now exist with Argentina.
Argentina's meat and grains are not particularly
desired by the United States, consequently they are barred
by tariffs and quarantine restrictions. As a result the
trade between the two countries has a balance unfavorable
to Argentina, as well as a resentment not exactly favor-
16
able to the United States. To bar these products, the
only exportable Argentine items, makes a mutual trade im-
possible. As a direct result of their resentment, the
inevitable has occurred; the Latin Americans have enacted
tariffs against products from the United States in direct
retaliation. Discrimination of any kind against the goods
of one country breeds retaliation in kind, with utter dis-
regard of the real economic needs of the countries in-
volved. Thus economic nationalism continues to create
15. Davis, Foreign Affairs
,
July, 1931, 561.
16. Ibid.
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economic nationalism.
As this is being written there are signs that
the United States will seek to adjust some of the trade
difficulties with the other Americas. Her Secretary of
State, a confirmed internationalist, has only recently
returned from Montevideo where he made very significant
advances to these same countries toward freer trade re-
lations. In their very nature, these advances must be
meaningless without material concessions on the part of
the United States. If Secretary Hull's efforts are
prophetic, the situation "points to the likelihood of in-
creasing severe competition in the South American markets
between the exporters of the United States and Europe,
17
especially Great Britain".
Any gain made by the United States at this point
will be, to some extent, a loss to Europe.
17. Cole, GWC, 322.
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CHAPTER V.
THE TREND IN THE UNITED STATES
There is no clearer picture of the opposing trends
than is depicted by the experience of the United States, due
to its unparalleled productive resources and free trading
area. High protective tariffs have been maintained, with
minor periods of reaction, from the beginning of its indus-
trial development. A self-contained economy is more nearly
possible here than in any other country, but the aim and
trend in the United States has been in both directions.
International relations have assumed a constantly increas-
ing importance through the creation of the largest trade of
any country in the world.
The Civil War Period
Before the Civil War the American tariff policy
was one of vacillation between increases and decreases, de-
pending somewhat on which political party happened to be in
power. "Protectionists ascribed prosperity to high tariffs,
depression to low tariffs; free traders have reversed the
(1)
inference." During the war, every session of Congress
enacted tariff increases, so great was the need of revenue
to carry on the great struggle. The war left the country
in a state of economic and financial prostration, still more
revenue was imperative and the quickest and easiest way to
1 . Taussig, TH, 109.

get it, since the fundamental machinery and organization was
already created, seemed to be through an expansion of the
tariff. An expansion in every sense of the word was
adopted. Duties previously imposed were raised higher than
they ever had been, and a vast number of commodities which
had always enjoyed free exchange were given the extra pen-
2
alty. Any study of post-War periods leaves no doubt
that war is a direct cause of tariffs, while the struggle
for economic advantage which preceded the World War, leaves
little doubt that tariffs represent, at least, a contribut-
ing cause of war
.
At the Beginning of the Century
Thus the basis of the tariff system which was oper
ating in this country at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, was an urgent need of revenue following a disastrous
civil conflict. At the time the various measures were
enacted, "There was neither time nor disposition to inquire
critically into the meaning and effect of any proposed
scheme of rates. The easiest and quickest plan was to im-
pose the duties which the domestic producers suggested as
3
necessary for their protection."
Such an opportunity to further personal and group
interests at the expense of the public, was not overlooked,
with the result that the system contained many utterly inde-
2. Taussig, TH, 160.
3. Ibid., 166.
zc i
cSl/O *1 J8J33 J.
fensible duties; abuses naturally resulting from work hasti-
ly done. It was clearly understood that emergency measures
of this kind were only temporary, and would, of course, be
replaced by a system more carefully planned, with the pass-
ing of the emergency. But no retreat of any significance
ever materialized. The industries which stood to gain,
consolidated their interests with each passing year and
exerted a type of pressure found only in a representative
form of government.
By the year 1900, the two American political par-
ties still gave lip service to opposing philosophies of
the tariff question, but the trend of their tariff legis-
lation continued upward, so powerful had become the in-
terests which they both must serve. The questions of
government revenue and of protection to domestic indus-
tries had long since become hopelessly confused. Pro-
tection and revenues are, of course, inconsistent objec-
tives. Protection must stop competitive imports if it
is to be effective, and as it becomes effective, revenue
must decrease. Although high tariffs characterize
nationalistic tendencies, the national interest can hard-
ly be placed at the foundation of these American duties;
rather the interest was stark individualism. Until very
recently called into question, this same individualism
was something of which the American public was taught to
be proud. And the lesson has been taught very assiduous-
4. Taussig, TH
, 357.

ly by means of vast quantities of propaganda containing
arguments which gradually shifted their stress from the
protection of young industries to the protection of the
American worker's job, his wages, and his standard of
living. By this time the United States was already a
great industrial nation. If its industries were still
in any actual need of protection, it is doubtful that
the arguments would have been changed.
The Tariff Act of 1909 (Payne -Aldrich Tariff)
This tariff revision, the first to fall within
the scope of the present study, was enacted during a
period of widespread American prosperity. The previous
measure, the act of 1897, had been in operation for twelve
years, which was the longest life enjoyed by any previous
measure. Furthermore, the act of 1897 had imposed the
highest levels in the country's history, the average rate
of the total value of dutiable imports during the first
5
year of the bill being approximately 52 per cent
.
Along with prosperity at this time, went indus-
trial expansion and concentration into large-scale pro-
duction units. In the public mind there had been a grow-
ing suspicion toward the trusts, the growth of which was
6
believed by many to be fostered by high tariffs. Whether
or not the tariff was responsible, it is certain that
5. U.S. Tariff Commission, DTI, 756.
6. Ibid.
IMIA
hitherto unheard of profits were being made in certain of
the protected industries, and obviously, it is possible to
create monopoly profits by shutting out all competition.
It is probable that tariffs serve to intensify the trend
toward a combination which is inherent in large-scale pro-
7
duct ion.
Many people thought that the principle of protec-
tion had gone too far; that the special interests were
having things too much their own way; and that the public
was paying a price needlessly high. In deference to this
sentiment "The national Republican platform of 1908 de-
clared that 'the true principle of protection is best
maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal
the difference between the cost of production at home and
8
abroad, together with a reasonable degree of profit'".
In order to carry out the research necessary to
determine the costs on which this principle was based,
authority to establish a tariff board was given in this
act. The principle of reciprocity, formerly established
in a hesitant and feeble manner, was abandoned; and just
at a time when other countries were negotiating treaties
9
on a reciprocal concession principle. In its place
was adopted the principle of maximum and minimum rates,
not in order to reduce rates, it is important to notice,
but rather to apply the maximum tariff where the President
,
7. Taussig, TH, 362.
8. U.S. Tariff Commission, DTI, 756.
9. Ibid.
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with the help of the board, might determine its desir-
ability.
The Tariff Act of 1913 (Underwood Tariff)
Despite the rising opposition to the persistent
adherence to a policy of rigid protection, the previous
act had brought about no material reduction. Congres-
sional bickering and bargaining, under the whip-cracking
of a strong manufacturers' lobby, reduced the "true prin-
ciple", which had been so widely heralded, to a mere
gesture
.
A political reversal brought the Democratic party
into power in the year 1912, pledged to still another prin-
ciple of protection, under the leadership of President
Wilson.
"The attempt was made 'to introduce in
every line of industry a competitive tariff basis
providing for a substantial amount of importation,
to the end that no concern shall be able to feel
that it has a monopoly on the home market gained
other than through the fact that it is able to fur-
nish better goods at lower prices than others'." *°
Although Congress reduced rates generally, made
additions to the list of commodities to be imported free of
duty, lowered rates on necessities in relation to luxuries,
and replaced many specific by ad valorem rates, the
average reduction was less than people generally had been
10. U.S. Tariff Commission, DTI, 777.

led to expect. For the first eight months of operation,
the average ad valorem rate was estimated to be about
11
36 per cent. Many of the reductions had little or
no effect, since the previous rate had been much higher
than was necessary to exclude the goods. In other cases
the former rates were protective in name only, inasmuch
as they applied to products regularly exported; namely,
agricultural products, cotton goods, and many other
12
manufactures.
Just before the Republican defeat, one step
toward better trade relations with Canada had been taken.
Against angry and vociferous opposition, a reciprocity
treaty was authorized by both branches of Congress, pro-
posing free admission of certain agricultural products
and raw materials. Wheat was included among these pro-
posals, which gave the opposition occasion to spread
warnings of grave danger throughout the great farm sec-
13
tions of the country. Hardly a duty could be more
meaningless in either the United States or Canada than
one on wheat, since both countries primarily are ex-
porters of wheat.
The Tariff Act of 1922 (Fordney-McCumber
)
After many years of extreme protection, a few
years of even such reductions as were embodied in the
act if 1913, would permit very clarifying comparisons
11. U.S. Tariff Commission, DTI, 777.
12. Ibid. , 757.
13. Taussig, TH, 414.
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regarding the true effect of tariffs on the protected
industries. But this was not to be permitted. Although
the act was in operation for nine years, the World War
broke out before the end of one year, causing most ab-
normal conditions of trade and industry for the whole
war period and for years afterward. Imports were reduced
14
as no customs duties had ever accomplished it. Estab-
lished industries were stimulated to greatly increased
levels of production and many new industries were created,
both from urgent emergency needs and from unusual oppor-
tunities for excessive profits.
Unlike the Civil War period, no tariff changes
were made during the years of the World War. With no
foreign countries supplying goods, it was necessary to
secure additional revenues from other sources. By the
year 1921, general prices, which had risen far beyond
reason, suffered a disastrous deflation. Especially
severe was the price decline of wheat, corn, meat, wool,
and sugar, and the farmers clamored for some kind of
15
relief. Emergency tariffs on these products were
passed in 1921 but their prices continued to decline,
and the principle of tariff increases as a remedy for
depressed economic conditions failed to establish itself.
Curiously enough, this failure did not deter
the agricultural interests. On the other hand, they
14. Taussig, TH, 414.
15. Ibid. , 452.
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looked upon these duties as an opportunity, which had
long been denied them, to secure their share of the
magic properties of the tariff which had served the
manufacturing interest so well by way of profits and
prosperity. This addition of the forces of agriculture
to those of industry, on the side of protection through
tariffs, was very significant in shaping the trend from
this point to the present time. One side could be de-
pended on to approve any duties which the other might
now seek, even though both might be adversely affected
in the process.
All kinds of concessions were made to the
farm interests in the permanent bill of 1922. The rates
of the Emergency Act, at the time intended to be of a
temporary nature, were incorporated into the permanent
measure with increases, together with many new rates in-
volving little or no effect. It was comparatively easy,
under the circumstances, to placate the farmer, while
his nebulous ideas about actual trade conditions pre-
vented him from seeing that his course would do nothing
to reduce the prices of the goods he must buy.
The professed aim as to principle was again
that of equalizing costs of production between domestic
and foreign producers. Authorization was given the Presi
dent to increase rates within a range of 50 per cent of
the figures established in the act in order to secure
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a condition of equality. The President was to rely upon
the Tariff Commission to secure the cost data for his
changes by proclamation. This provision was included
in order to add a flexibility to the tariff during
changing conditions between Congressional revisions.
The Tariff Act of 1930 ( Smoot-Hawley
)
Limited tariff revision was requested at this
time by President Hoover. Agricultural conditions con-
tinued to be the chief influence. The farmer considered
his protection still insufficient in relation to manu-
facturing, since his business continued to be poor with
falling prices and accumulating surplus stocks. On the
other hand high prices maintained on supplies which he
had to buy, partly because of a highly artificial finan-
cial boom which had already run its course, and no one
knew what was to follow. Farm prices had not responded
to the inflation and clearly agriculture was under a dis
advantage.
President Hoover asked for a revision of such
of the then existing rates as particularly affected agri
culture, but Congress failed to adhere to any idea of
limited revision. In the political campaign of 1928
the platforms of both parties supported protection of
industry, leaving the question only one of degree. Lack-
ing any organized opposition, tariff action became the

familiar log-rolling process of give and take in which
actual economic needs are completely lost. Instead of
quick action to raise the duty on a few specific commod-
ities, the legislation dragged on through a whole year,
to the dissatisfaction and disgust of all concerned,
finally producing the most sweeping upward revision in
the history of the country, raising rates in most cases
16
on a list of 1500 items. This opinion is fairly sub-
stantiated by the figures on page 66. While these fig-
ures are not to be taken for any positive calculations,
they do justify conclusions regarding the trend. The
computation was made by the Tariff Commission just after
the act of 1930 became law, based upon the value of 1928
17
imports
.
Although it might be said that popular dis-
approval has been characteristic of most of the United
States tariff legislation, this 1930 revision produced
immediate world repercussions. During its long and
tortuous passage, protests against the obvious trend were
received from practically every important European trad-
ing country, and several countries took immediate action
18
in retaliation, notably France, Argentina, and Canada.
In the past, public apathy has permitted Con-
gress to play ball with the tariff. Public action was
16. Paul M. Mazur, Outlook , June 18, 1930.
17. Taussig, TH, 518.
18. P.M. Mazur, loc.cit.
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AVERAGE RATES, BY SCHEDULES, IN THE TARIFF ACTS OF
1922 and of 1930*
Act of
: 1922
:
per cent
: Act of :
: 1930 :
:
percent :
: 1. Chemicals, oils, and paints \ 29.22 : 31.40
: 2. Earths, earthenwares, and
glassware 45.62 53.62 :
: 3. Metals and manufactures of \ 33.71 35.01 ]
: 4. Wood and manufactures of 7.97 10.49 I
! 5. Sugar, molasses, and
manufactures of \ 67.85 77.21
: 6. Tobacco and manufactures of \ 63.09 \ 64.78 |
: 7. Agricultural products and
provisions 19.86 '< 33.62 \
: 8. Spirits, wines, and other «
beverages 36.48 : 47.44 \
: 9. Manufactures of cotton
j
40.27 i 46.42 |
: 10. Flax, hemp, jute and
;
manufactures of 18.16 : 19.14 !
: 11. Wool and manufactures of 49.54 : 59.83 ':
: 12. Manufactures of silk
: 56.56 : 59.13 :
: 13. Manufactures of rayon < 52.68 \ 53.62 :
: 14. Paper and books ; 24.72 : 26.06 ':
: 15. Sundries . 21.97 : 27.39 i
# Taussig, TH, 518-19.
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rather more concerted during the prolonged wrangling over
this bill, various features of which were voted, defeated,
and again voted in one of the most exasperating examples
of the party political system. Newspapers, economists,
professors, and bankers protested long and energetically;
foreign representatives criticized the measure publicly
in defiance of diplomatic codes; the President threaten-
ed to withhold his signature, but tradition and the more
effectively organized lobbies carried through to the
19
bitter end. "The judgment of sober men of all parties,
and even of the staunch protectionists, was that there
20
had been a sad exhibition of political ineptitude."
Summary of the Acts
In spite of occasional signs of revolt, the
general course of the United States tariff has been
definitely upward. Each time those persons engaged in
the production of goods subject to foreign competition,
and therefore interested in tariff increases, have found
organized effort advantageous, while those who would
benefit by reduction have been too inarticulate to win
popular support.
Trade has grown during the period despite grow-
ing restrictions, in response to a constantly expanding
production and consumption of a vast population. Certain
19. Editorial comment, Outlook , June 18, 1930.
20. Taussig, TH, 500.
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raw materials not produced in the United States, have
been required in greater quantities and at the same
time Europe has continued to require certain American
raw products. An eagerness to sell with a reluctance
to buy, indicates an attitude of intolerance toward
foreign trade which has created extreme irritation abroad.
Two of the acts saw attempts to formulate new
principles of protection; cost equalization and the com-
petitive tariff principle. The principles received
scant consideration in the process of political bargain-
ing through which each act was obliged to pass. Cost
investigations have been made by the Tariff Commission,
long and tedious ones, for the method is by no means
simple. Their influence on the tariff has been negli-
gible, while irritation caused by the presence of govern-
ment investigators in other countries has been consider-
able, necessitating their withdrawal in some instances.
The cause of friendliness is not furthered by an open
disregard of facts presented for consideration. Several
countries submitted carefully prepared statements of
competitive conditions as they watched the progress of
Congressional debates over rates on commodities serious-
ly affecting their own trade. This they did voluntarily,
in an effort to secure a fair opportunity for their
goods in the great American market. "The communications
were printed as a public document, but that was about
10 yon
oo no tail
21
all the satisfaction that their authors obtained."
Foreign business men are at a loss to under-
stand the disregard of the cost principle by the Ameri-
can Congress when its own commission submits compara-
tive data which have been secured after long and ex-
haustive investigation. Mr. Bidwell becomes specific
22
in the following examples:
"Italian exporters of canned tomatoes
find the new rate on their products to be 50
per cent, whereas a recently published report
of the United States Tariff Commission showed
that 31 per cent would equalize cost differ-
ences. The same report indicated that only a
20 per cent duty was necessary to equalize
foreign and domestic costs of tomato paste,
but Congress raised the duty notwithstanding
from 15 to 50 per cent.
...
Congress raised the
rate on flaxseed to 65 cents a bushel, although
the Commissions findings indicated a rate of
56 cents."
In a study of the significance of tariff in-
creases, it is impossible to ignore the immense shrinkage
in the American volume of trade which followed the 1930
tariff. World prices had already started to decline when
this tariff became law and by the year 1932 the decline
was unprecedented. Previous depression periods have
also brought price declines, but no great decline in
volume of trade. For instance, in the depression of
1907 it was estimated that the volume decline was only
23
about 7 per cent, whereas in 1932 the trade of the
21. P. W. Bidwell, Foreign Affairs , Oct., 1930.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
,
April, 1932.
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United States fell, as well as world trade, more than
30 per cent from the long time trend and more than 60
24
per cent from the 1929 peak. The condition facing
the country as the last tariff measure was being con-
sidered, was not one of domestic adjustment only, it was
a world condition which was to experience, at the end of
two more years, a loss in world trade of some forty bil-
25
lions of dollars.
It is true that other factors than tariffs
played their part in the violent collapse which started
in 1930, but surely the United States did not contribute
anything constructive by enacting the most prohibitive
schedule of rates in all its history. Nor can the im-
mediate steps taken in retaliation by other countries,
be considered a helpful contribution.
For seven years after the 1922 increases the
United states enjoyed industrial prosperity, although
signs were not lacking that in its prosperity were arti-
ficial elements which would sooner or later demand adjust-
ment. European recovery was not so pronounced. Currencies
had depreciated and the leading nations were having great dif
ficulties in balancing their budgets. Several world confer-
ences gathered with an outstanding unanimity of purpose;
namely, to find some way to remove the many trade barriers
and lower the tariff walls with which all nations had sur-
24. R.L. Buell, The New York Times
,
June 18, 1933.
25. Ibid.
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rounded themselves. Although no great progress had been
made, it is reasonable to think that Europe would continue
the effort, moreover, that similar difficulties would soon
bring the cooperation of the United States. Into this situa-
tion, already ridiculous, the United States injected the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act and the European response was unani-
mous and undisguised disapproval.
Agriculture
It has been said that the plight of agriculture
inspired the act of 1930 and the comparison of rates by
schedules which appears above in a discussion of the act,
shows plainly that the rates of the agricultural schedule
were severely increased. It is also clear that the final
result was not exactly pleasing to the farmers, who hoped
to eliminate the advantage which the manufacturers had
enjoyed for so long. Agricultural increases could not be
secured without conceding still further manufacturing in-
creases.
In a large measure agriculture asked for a
protection that does not protect against anything. Nearly
all of the farm products of importance are exported. For
many years the chief American agricultural exports have
been cotton, bread grains and flour, meat and meat products,
and tobacco. With the exception of sugar and wool, the
26
heavy imports have been non-competing in every sense. No
26. W. Gard, Nation
,
Feb. 8, 1933, 147.
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advantage to the farmer is possible from imposing tariffs
on goods that are not imported or on goods which he does
not produce himself. Sugar and wool have long been the
center of heated tariff controversy, but their domestic
production has not materially increased under protection.
The National Grange, with a membership of
800,000, is probably the most representative group organ-
27
ization of the farming population. In 1929 the Grange
presented a tariff brief to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, with the central demand for a protection equal to
that enjoyed by industry. There was no consideration of
their relative position; of the manner in which manufactur-
ing secured its protection; of a possible loss to all when
all are protected; or of the possibility that the real need
was wider markets. Nothing mattered except that some group
discrimination existed, and whether for good or for ill,
equal favor should be extended to all. The chief executive
of the National Grange enunciated its platform with these
28
words ;
"The farmers of the nation are in favor
of tariff adjustment in Schedule 7 as well as the
other schedules that affect their industry and are
not seeking to interfere with tariff protection
where justified and enjoyed by other groups, but
we do insist that the need of the farmer is that
tariff legislation may be rewritten, bringing
agriculture fully up to the protection enjoyed by
other groups .... It is a better program, and a
policy more in accord with wise national statesman-
ship to give the American farmer the American market
for products that can be domestically produced."
27. L.J. Taber, Annals, March, 1929, 329.
28. Ibid.
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The above reference to "the other schedules that
affect their industry "may have a most unfortunate result
for the farmer. Just what are the others that affect his
industry? Probably all of them do, in their bearing on the
goods he has to buy as well as on those he wants to buy. It
is certain that the rates on all of them were increased and
that his distress was not relieved.
Since little advantage can be gained by agricul-
ture through a policy of high tariffs, it is possible
that they result in comparatively harmless placating of a
very large and important group of the American public. How-
ever, it may easily be otherwise. Retaliation by other
countries has grown more significant in recent years, and
the more unreasonable the policy is made to appear, the more
rapid and vicious is the retaliation. The National Grange
claims a persistent and consistent demand during the last
29
forty years for a "Tariff for all or a tariff for none".
Yet the trade situation had rather different elements forty
years ago, in other words about the time of the McKinley
tariff in the year 1890. At that time the American exports
were mainly raw materials and foodstuffs, in fact about 75
30
per cent of the total exports. "For this reason the
United States often found itself able to obtain minimum
29. L. J. Taber, Annals, March, 1929, 329.
30. Andre Siegfried, Foreign Affairs
,
October, 1929, 13.
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tariff conditions. Europe needed the new continent as a pro-
vider of primary products and the new continent did not need
Europe. This has ceased to be true. Manufactured goods con-
stitute over one-half of present American exports, and against
them retaliation is possible, a fact of which Europe is well
aware, and which may in the long run do much to modify the
31
spirit of traditional American tariff policy."
It has been mentioned that since the end of the
World War there has been marked prosperity for industry but
very lean years for agriculture. Some fifty million acres
went out of production in Europe during the war and nearly
that many new American acres were applied with all haste,
for Europe then stood in dire need. This tremendously ex-
panded world market ceased to exist soon after the war
ended, but there was no deflation of the American produc-
tion. In fact it appears that more acres were added for
32
export production. Of course war prices had soared
with a subsequent fall to levels which remained persis-
tently low, while the world market began to contract and
surpluses to accumulate.
If mutually exclusive trends could be dis-
cerned long before the World War in the competing indus-
trial development of various nations, it became distress-
ingly apparent in the years that followed. Each successive
31. Andre" Siegfried
,
Foreign Affairs
.
October, 1929, 13.
32. Secretary H.A. Wallace, The New York Times
.
Feb. 25,1934.
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political administration has considered it necessary to try
some new expedient to lift the special strain from agricul-
ture. Immediately following the war an immense amount of
trade was continued purely on credit. American bankers
loaned in order that others might buy, a process which could
not go on indefinitely in the face of conditions precluding
the settlement of the credits. "While this false foreign
market for American exports was being maintained, Congress,
amid general consent, twice raised tariffs. Schedules were
33
raised in 1922 and again in 1930."
Thus agriculture forced the issue in the matter
of these last increases, but continued to sink until the
advent of an entirely new experiment by the present adminis-
tration. The government indicates a definite crop reduction
through the retirement of surplus acres, reimbursing the
farmers who thus cooperate, from a processing tax which is
secured indirectly from all consumers. Such a measure is
put forward as a temporary solution only; a measure being
tried along with many others by a country in crisis. The
permanent solution is, of course, far from clear at the
moment. It is clear, however, that tariff policies have
been woven closely into the pattern which now appears to be
desperately inadequate. It is clear also that a reconsider-
ation of American tariffs cannot be long postponed. The
fundamental interests of the American farmer and manufac-
33, Secretary H.A.Wallace, The New York Times , Feb. 25,1934.

turer have been gradually converging and do not seem to be
served by trade restrictions.
The Public and the Tariff
It must seem strange to the average American that
the tariff continues to be a source of so much political agi-
tation; that regardless of how he votes the matter never seems
to be settled with any real finality; and that when such a
settlement is apparently secured, the question appears again
in only a few years in the light of the same old controversy.
Several complete political turnovers have been voted, placing
in power an administration pledged to lower tariff rates, from
which no material reduction ever resulted. Acts are passed
after long and bitter Congressional strife toward the end of
which nearly everyone is disgusted and exasperated. As legis-
lative debate progresses the measures satisfy nobody, yet
everybody is certain they will become law. The acceptance
of a situation of this kind by the American public cannot be
comprehended without an understanding of the method employed
in making the country's tariff policies. It will be seen
in the following chapter, where this matter is pursued fur-
ther, that nothing in the shape of a consistent policy, en-
tirely in the public interest, can be expected from legisla-
tors who must constantly placate their own particular con-
stituents. In the American political system this means
bowing to whatever interests hold the balance of power among
OB VI©
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their constituents.
Economists and the general public were of one ac-
cord on protection of industries when both the country and
its industries were young. But as the country gained the
number one position among the industrial nations, it was
obviously ludicrous to seek "infant" protection. That par-
ticular argument appears to be the only one which the protec-
tion seekers discarded. Considerable success has attended
efforts to set up in the public mind, a carry-over of the
same fundamental reasoning, to protection for any industry
new to the country, however economically unsound it might be.
The many factors affecting economic soundness
give validity to the principle of comparative advantage,
which "says that in the aggregate the people of the United
States do not gain so much from the higher prices which they
get for what they sell as they lose from not being able to
34
buy in the cheapest markets" . The people cannot demand the
right to buy in the cheapest markets at the same time they
are sponsoring such principles as home market protection,
adequate protection against lower foreign standards of liv-
ing, against lower production costs, and a general condition
of national self-sufficiency. Many of these principles hold
only when other facts of trade and exchange are ignored, as
the American producer may soon learn.
For many years public appeals for protection
34. J. D.Black, Annals
.
Jan. 1929, 126.
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have contained a minimum of reason and a maximum of prejudice
and emotion.
"To patronize the foreigner is unpatriotic;
good Americans should spend their money in this country
and by keeping it at home give employment to the Amer-
ican working man; we should not buy cheap foreign
goods but patronize our own manufacturers who very
generously pay high wages, so that our workers can
maintain the American standard of living." 35
In the course of a few decades thousands of workmen are trained
in the industries which are created and maintained by protec-
tive duties; thousands more become vitally interested through
the investment of their own money. These form a powerful
alliance with the controlling groups, making very remote the
possibility of removing or even lowering duties, except dur-
ing a prolonged crisis.
It is quite true that some industries would decay
if protection were withdrawn. Profits and wages would go
down, return on invested funds would disappear, and workers
would have to seek employment in other trades. Self interest
of a very natural kind brings an ever growing number of the
public to the support of high tariffs. The economist con-
tends, however, that "The argument is applicable only to
those industries which are not properly suited to the coun-
36
try," and are, for that reason, at a disadvantage com-
pared with other industries in which the effectiveness of
labor and capital is greater.
35. H.F.Fraser, Annals
.
Jan. 1929, 53.
36. Ibid
. .
57.
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An examination of the last few United States
tariff acts discloses more evidence of the principle of
setting rates to equalize production costs than any other
principle. To the public this seems fair and reasonable.
But carried to its logical conclusion, it would justify the
domestic production of anything and everything. Furthermore
the public does not realize the difficulties involved in
determining such costs in any case, regardless of the possible
economic justification for using them. There is a wide varia-
tion in production costs throughout an industry in any given
country, as well as a great variety in methods of computation.
Standard cost methods do not exist to any great extent and
in many business units no accurate figures are ever deter-
mined. Investigations of this nature are infinitely more dif-
ficult to carry out in foreign countries. Finally, the public
might wonder why the legislators should authorize difficult
and expensive investigations only to disregard them complete-
ly in the process of fixing rates. At tariff hearings a mass
of testimony is given by manufacturers, urging Congress not to
change the tariffs except to raise them; testimony which
largely fails to prove anything regarding production costs,
and is all too plainly aimed at prohibition rather than
37
protection.
The actual economics of trade and usual effect
on prices, wages, employment and living standards are not
37. Tarbell, TOT, 299.

easily carried to the voters; they are not easily dramatized.
On the other hand, many of the fallacies or half truths carry
a strong appeal. The domestic worker can be very positive
that the exclusion of foreign goods automatically will bring
an increase of employment at home.
Now that high protection has been secured by agri-
culturist and manufacturer alike, with insufficient purchas-
ing power to absorb the total volume of production, perhaps
the public will be ready to question the traditional hostility
to trade. The government moves toward measures to absorb
so.ne of the unemployed and to restrict surplus production -
obstinate problems which are not entirely products of the
1930 depression.
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CHAPTER VI
.
METHODS OF MAKING THE TARIFF
The United States Method
In an examination of tariff policies no great
amount of detail normally would be justified regarding the
means of putting them into effect. When, however, there
is in the method a defect so vital as to cause the repeated
defeat of a policy demanded by the popular vote, the true
significance of a trend can hardly be determined without a
critical examination of the defect. Such a defect unques-
tionably exists in the method employed by the United States
It should be possible to set the rates of duty
in accordance with a declared policy, but the influence of
special interests and blocs of interests has consistently
prevented the practice in the United States. Furthermore,
until recent years the legislators have at various times
attempted to fix rates without the necessary information as
to what the rates ought to be. The services of the Tariff
Commission ought to be very helpful in such a serious diffi
culty. That the rates have been more likely to follow the
requests of special interests than the Tariff Commission
2
findings, has already been indicated. The invariable
1. Page, MTUS, 3.
2. See page 69.
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failure of Congress to produce a tariff bill with rates truly
in the public interest as well as in the interest of American
commerce and industry, has caused a demand for a different
method
.
"The causes of these failures are numer-
ous; but two, each vital in itself, are more per-
sistent. The first is the difficulty of ascertain-
ing the precise rates and provisions that will accom-
plish the purpose desired. The second is that some
members of Congress are chiefly concerned in satisfy-
ing their own constituents and must be conciliated by
compromises, bargains, and special concessions before
votes enough to any bill can be obtained. In some
measure, of course, the treatment of the tariff by
these members as a local issue, is due to prejudice
or to a wish to remain in office, but in greater
measure it rests on less worthy grounds."*
It is practically out of the question to expect
the Congressmen who are chiefly responsible for these bills
to secure, or even understand, the mass of facts involved
in an equitable adjustment of so many separate and distinct
rates. These men have other activities, many of which are
not essential to the proper execution of their public trust,
but nevertheless are entirely established by traditional
practice
.
Tradition decrees many things regarding Con-
gressional duties that will hardly stand a test of reason.
Revenue bills must originate in the Committee on Ways and
Means, considered the most important committee of the House
of Representatives. It is natural that membership in this
3. Page, MTUS, 10.
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committee is coveted. It is not so natural that special fit-
ness is not made the basis of selection. Rather the appoint-
ments are made principally from seniority of service and
secondarily from geographic and factional divisions of the
4
House
.
There is no doubt that certain members of Congress
are better qualified than others for special committee work,
but organization goes forward on the assumption of equality.
Because they lack the time, and usually the ability, to con-
sider and interpret the vast amount of commercial information
available through various agencies, the committees resort to
the method of public hearings. Those appearing must be brief
if the work is to be finished within a reasonable time. They
are not sworn to give the truth and certainly do not when
the truth would prejudice their cases. In short, the Con-
gressional hearings listen to all manner of influence but
very little real information.
Following the House hearings the Committee on
Finance of the Senate holds similar hearings of its own.
Many changes are certain to be made by the senate committee
and many more when later the bill is taken up in a confer-
ence committee composed of members of both houses. The de-
tails of the proposed bill become known as it issues from
the House of Representatives and all selfish pressure is
4. Page, MTUS, 12.
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redoubled with the appearance of a direct target at which to
shoot. After the hearings the committees hold closed ses-
sions for the trading and bargaining process, without which
it is impossible to get a bill reported for voting. Usually
the voting is perfunctory. The members know that major
changes at this time would be fatal to the passage of the
bill; any bill at all is better than no bill, after the long
and tedious process. Furthermore, that is just about the
philosophy with which the country receives the bill.
It is unlikely that any other kind of tariff bill
can be secured, in a representative form of government, until
some method is provided whereby the representatives are able
easily and gracefully to refer the inevitable pressure from
special interests to a special body established for the purpose.
There are many economic and social relations in the life of a
people, not subject to precise measurement, that should in-
5
fluence decisions in legislating duties. The irresponsi-
ble American method never has given due weight to social con-
cerns
.
In a popular government "No reasonable person can
expect the protective system to be handled without compromises
and errors of judgment, but he can expect it to be handled as
6
a principle and not as a commodity". Errors and compromises
5. George Crompton, Annals
,
Jan. 1929, 115.
6. Tarbell, TOT, 363.
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can be reduced to a minimum only through concentration of re-
sponsibility for the legislative details; a condition that
cannot be realized as long as the two branches of Congress
are free to change and mutilate each measure.
7
Method in the United Kingdom
Until very recently, tariffs in Great Britain were
recommended to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as
part of his Annual Budget. Revenue considerations chiefly in-
fluenced the decisions to impose duties on non-competing com-
modities such as tea, coffee, liquors, and tobacco. Since the
World War the demand for protective duties has grown more prom-
inent and a second method has been employed. Under this method
any industry may petition the Board of Trade for tariff con-
sideration. The Board may appoint special investigating com-
mittees and on the basis of their reports the Chancellor may
ask Parliament to sanction changes at any time during the year.
Before the Board of Trade will even appoint an
investigating committee it must be satisfied on such condi-
tions as the following:
1. That the industry is of substantial importance;
2. That competition of foreign imports is exceptional,
and employment is seriously affected;
3. That there is unfair competition because one or
more of the following conditions obtain in the
countries from which competition comes:
(a) depreciation of currencies,
(b) subsidies,
(c) lower wages, longer hours, or unfair conditions
of employment
;
7. All facts taken from Henry Chalmers, Annals
.
Jan., 1929, 68-72.
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4. That the home industry is carried on with reasonable
efficiency and economy; and
5. That the imposition of a duty will not have an ad-
verse effect upon employment in any other industry.
These conditions are entirely too severe to estab-
lish a general system of protection with any great rapidity,
and the main body of British opinion was not ready for general
protection. It has been too difficult for industries to estab-
lish their claims to both the Board of Trade and the special
committees. Investigations moved too slowly, it was claimed
by many, and disconcerting inconsistencies resulted from the
appointment of a separate committee to investigate each appli-
cation. The decision may often turn on a committee's inter-
pretation of such points as "abnormal importations", "unfair
competition", "substantial importance", or "exceptional im-
ports" and in the interpretation of such criteria, it would
be remarkable if different committees did not develop marked
inconsistencies.
Earlier in this study it was said that the World
8
War shook the foundations of British free trade. The method
just outlined, however, continued to hold back the protective
trend until the world crisis. Under new acts of 1931 and
1932, special powers are granted the Board of Trade for general
protective duties without special investigations. In addition,
the new acts created a special advisory committee which may or
may not become a permanent factor in the British method.
8. See page 29.
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The Canadian Method
Tariff making practice in Canada resembles the
British practice in certain respects. Here also it is con-
nected with the Annual Budget presented to Parliament by the
Minister of Finance. Since the establishment of the Tariff
Advisory Board in 1926, the usual method is for those interested
in a tariff change to petition the Minister of Finance for a
review by the Tariff Board. There are two possibilities of
unfavorable action in the primary stages of a petition. In
the first place, the Minister may not see fit to pass the
matter on to the Tariff Board; and in the second place, the
Board may, upon a preliminary investigation, refuse to pursue
a complete investigation on the grounds that the application
is not meritorious.
The Canadian Tariff Board has only three members,
is permanent in organization, and is composed of particular-
ly able and well qualified men. Public hearings are held by
this board of specialists whose jobs are not in danger from
those seeking economic privilege. The members are free to
employ other experts to assist them as the occasion may re-
quire
.
The Board aims to relieve the Minister of Finance,
and through him the Government, from the necessity of making
decisions without the proper facts as to what the rates ought
9. Chalmers, op.cit., 73-78.
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to be in their relation to general conditions.
A second method of revising tariffs in Canada
gives to Parliament authority to conclude commercial treaties,
involving reciprocal concessions, with various British or for-
eign countries. Arrangements of this kind usually consist
of granting the benefit of rates previously fixed by law in
the three-level schedules; in short, the substitution of one
level for another.
10
The Australian Method
As in the other Empire units just examined, the
tariff making procedure in Australia consists of a general
policy proclaimed by a Minister of the Cabinet Government,
who supports actual rates which are recommended by a tariff
board. The Ministers and legislatures are not required by
law to act upon the findings and recommendations of the
boards. Nevertheless, action on tariffs is seldom taken
until the boards have made an examination and a report.
The Australian Tariff Board has become an indis-
pensable unit in the tariff making organization. In fact,
the Australian law forbids tariff action of any consequence
without an examination and report by the Board. Naturally,
it is impossible to attach new articles to a bill, while in
process of legislation under this method.
10. Chalmers, op.cit., 78-92.
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The advantages that are claimed for this method,
appear to provide a solution for some of the most glaring
faults in the American method. They may be summarized as
f oil ows
:
1. It makes possible the consideration of tariff
claims from the viewpoint of a broad national
policy, rather than having a tariff revision
consist of an aggregation of special and un-
related claims for protection;
2. It makes possible the building of a well-
balanced as well as consistent tariff structure,
that does justice to the different elements
within the country;
3. It reduces materially the log-rolling that seems
almost unavoidably incident to the building of
a tariff by a political body.
In both Canada and Australia the boards are in-
structed to give particular attention to the possibility of
an injurious effect upon the consumer, and upon other indus-
tries that may use the product. This is a very significant
feature of the trend in the Empire areas toward a larger
use of tariff boards. In each case, the board is a specially
constituted body of experts to whom the governments look for
guidance and advice. They are able to subject all claims for
duties to a searching examination without fear of political
consequences to themselves, and it is evident that they do
require applicants to justify their claims on economic and
social grounds. When compared with the functions and respon-
sibilities of these bodies, the United States Tariff Commis-
sion is little more than a fact finding body.

11
Method in France
At one time French tariff making was wholly in
the hands of the French parliament at a sacrifice of stabil-
ity; a prodigious number of revisions were made over the
last three or four decades. Now, however, the parliament
seems to have delegated nearly its entire authority in this
field to the ministry.
Through its power to make treaties, the ministry
has created a conventional system wholly on the basis of
apparent requirements in the relations of France with other
nations. France is one of the most conspicuous nations fol-
lowing the philosophy that trade must be founded on inequali-
ties. Bargaining forms an essential part of her tariff making,
in pursuance of which the broad application of the most-
favored-nation clause was abandoned immediately after the
war, and in its place has appeared individual treaties with
reciprocal concessions. The result is an extremely com-
plicated and intricate system of tariff schedules, but the
method is very representative of Europe today.
11. Facts are from G.H. Stuart, Annals , Jan. 1929, 98-106.
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CHAPTER VII.
RECENT ECONOMIC CONFERENCES
The World Economic Conference
It has been seen that post-war nationalism was re-
sponsible for wide spread upward tariff revisions throughout
the world. A more natural process would have been varying
tariff levels as the world level of prices was reduced.
But the world was not settling down to constructive business,
1
rather it plunged into a period of monetary instability.
To defend themselves against the dumping of goods on the
part of countries whose money was falling in value, many
countries passed emergency tariff increases along with a
variety of other restrictions. An extensive deflation
in 1920-1921 gave an impetus to just such tendencies, adding
further restrictions instead of permitting a general removal
of the temporary war measures.
With legislative bodies on every hand producing this
distinct trend, numerous conferences were called with the
avowed purpose of achieving tariff disarmament. The full
significance of the world striving against itself comes
into view in the futile deliberations and conclusions of
these conferences.
Attempts to reach more cordial economic under-
standings began in 1925 with the International Chamber of
1. Cole, OWC, 334.
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Commerce meeting at Brussels. The conclusion was enunciated
that an expansion of world trade could come only through the
2
clearing away of some of the obstacles and obstructions.
The following year produced the Bankers' Manifesto;
a statement signed by one hundred and fifteen leading bank-
ers representing sixteen nations. This statement called
for the removal of high tariffs and other barriers to inter-
3
national trade. Signatures to the manifesto represent men
who have been ranged on opposite sides of the protection
question. But these men became united in recognizing the
serious effect upon international commerce of the increas-
ing trade restrictions. They sought to impress the need
upon the financial and commercial interests of the world,
and through them upon the political heads of the nations.
Practically all of the leading nations sent dele-
gates to the World Economic Conference at Geneva in 1927;
4
about fifty of them, represented by 194 delegates. Here
again there was general agreement that tariff rates were
then too high and ought to be materially reduced. The
Conference worked with very complete and accurate infor-
mation for which it had the League of Nations to thank.
The League's Economic Division had been compiling data
for several years and promoting just such a gathering.
Delegates were eager to persuade others to reduce
their tariffs but each was careful to make no agreement
2. Johnsen, FT, 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Cole, GWC, 335.
Jr.cfc
jji*. & &i O089 i inAfn 9nJ o* &
noi $ ooioiii edi 'Jo asbia sJ'ia
93.
which would bind his country to reduce its own. "The
World Economic Conference had therefore to content it-
self with a general declaration in favour of tariff reduc-
tions, and with the advocacy of certain important but
5
secondary changes in tariff policy." An assembly of this
size and importance, practically in full agreement on the
major issue, should have made substantial progress. The
fact that it did not, indicates how formidable are the
obstacles to this kind of disarmament, and it begins to look
as though any international economic accord will be impos-
sible to achieve apart from a more enduring structure for
international peace. Little thought, except of self-
preservation, will be given until there is created a basis
for confidence in a lasting peace.
The Imperial Conference at Ottawa
As the United States Congress was bolting the re-
quest of President Hoover for a limited tariff revision in
1930, and passing a complete increase, a fitting sequel
was in progress just across the Canadian border. Repre-
sentatives from all the divisions of the British Empire
met at Ottawa in an attempt to reconcile their economic
differences. Their differences were real and the prefer-
ential ring around the Empire that resulted, although it
6
is not too tightly drawn at present, is also real.
Other Imperial Conferences have been held in the
5. Cole, GWC, 335.
6. G. Ellis, Nineteenth Century
,
Dec., 1932, 656.
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past in the hope of forming a closer economic unit, accom-
plishment, however, has been just about zero. England had
invariably approached the meetings from her free trade
angle and the Dominions from their protection angle. Neither
side could countenance an adoption of the other's principle.
The same opposition was present at Ottawa in 1930 and
threatened to wreck the conference at the very beginning, in
fact did check-mate the program and cause an adjournment
to 1932. There was no prevalent spirit of generosity and
good- wi 11.
Premier Bennett of Canada sounded the note that
stalled the conference, when he announced that Canada would
make no concessions that did not place Canadian interests
first; that no preferences would be granted that would
prevent complete absorption of her own production by the
Canadian market. Other Dominion representatives fell in
line with the same policy, declaring that the Canadian
position would be theirs also.
But England came with a request for a reduction
of Dominion duties that would give the British exporter
an equal opportunity with his local competitor. This
attack upon protection was open and direct, since protec-
tion gives a definite margin of advantage to the home pro-
ducer. Canada would give only vague promises in regard to
an equal opportunity for the British producer, who was
forced to get what confidence and satisfaction he could
from a Canadian agreement to the effe_ct that protection
.
Tos J trod*
against British competition would be afforded only to those
industries which are reasonably assured of success.
A policy of preference is born of protection
rather than free trade and requires protectionists to
7
carry it out. Heretofore, with no rates to reduce in
favor of Empire trade and none to apply against others,
Great Britain had little to offer. Canada, the real in-
stigator of this particular Conference, assumed that a
much more favorable basis of British opinion existed this
time. Some British protection was certainly in effect in
1930 and a great deal more by the time Ottawa reconvened
in 1932, but Britain reverted to her free trade philosophy
in her approach to Ottawa, in a frank attempt to eliminate
the existing barriers between the divisions of the Empire.
As a result, foreign comment has been disposed
to belittle the accomplishment which might be described
as a series of bilateral agreements, recognizing the di-
versities of the Empire members rather than their theo-
8
retical unity. Certain preferences are to be main-
tained or extended, either by a reduction of tariffs to
each other or by placing new duties on foreign imports.
In other cases imports are to be regulated by quotas
favoring Empire products. Open discriminations of this
kind against the trade of foreign nations are likely to
hold possibilities of future discord. These are bargains
7. Richard Jebo, Nineteenth Century
,
Oct. 1932, 399.
8. Ibid.
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at the expense of other trade,, instead of bargains indicat-
ing to other trade an equal willingness to negotiate, pro-
viding mutual advantages can be discovered. England could
not break down Dominion protection against the type of
manufactures which the Dominions unquestionably intend to
go on developing, so they all agreed more or less to place
added burdens on the trade of outsiders.
There is indeed a danger to other trade in the
compromise that came out of Ottawa, and the American trade
stands to lose about as heavily as any. Argentina was con-
cerned for her natural and profitable trade with Great Brit-
ain, when quotas were placed on her animal products in
order to favor Canadian products.
The trade between Canada and the United States
is very large in volume and mutually beneficial, if trade
is ever beneficial. Forcing tactics have to be employed
to restrict the flow of goods between these two countries,
the geographic position of which creates a very close eco-
nomic connection. Influences of the American tariff are
particularly strong in Canada and the United Kingdom.
Canada has come to resent the American policy very keenly
and has repeatedly retaliated with restrictions of her own.
British trade has suffered much at the hands of the American
tariff, and the latter has certainly been an important in-
fluence in the final acquiescence of the British to the
9
principle of protection.
S. Young, Annals
,
210.
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India's natural market is with China, Japan,
and other Asiatic countries, while Canada* s natural market
continues to be the United States, despite tariff policies
which tend to estrange their closely identified economic
interests. British Imperial Preference as a policy is no
more practical than it has been, but regardless of its
impracticali ty , additional steps in that direction are cer
tain to be taken if the American trend continues.
on
CHAPTER VIII.
CONCLUSION
Clearly discernible throughout the last three
decades are the two world trends to which frequent allusion
has been made in the course of this study. That they would
eventually clash was inevitable, and a repetition of the
ghastly conflict seems just as inevitable if the nations
go blindly onward in a frantic effort to live apart as self-
sustaining units. It seems unbelievable that such a war
could occur without clarifying the economic situation for
civilized people. From it, however, issued a treaty in
which new European political divisions were carved direct-
ly across natural economic divisions. Furthermore, a con-
scious attempt was made to prevent the economic develop-
ment of the defeated nations, providing the losers can be
named with any certainty.
Regardless of whether a spirit of rampant nation-
alism continues to be the main influence, the industrial-
ization of countries, hitherto producers only of primary
products, bids fair to continue. Great Britain already
feels the effect of this trend in the Far Eastern countries;
others are destined also to feel it.
The possibility of all countries reaching an equal
level of productive effectiveness and thereby supplying all
of their needs, is very remote. Natural advantages will
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persist, both from the standpoint of labor effectiveness
and the possession of the necessary elements of production.
But even insofar as nations do add to their list new prod-
ucts that require the importation of raw materials, the
process will be retarded unless there exists an adequate
means of payment. The other trend toward higher protec-
tive tariffs serves chiefly to obstruct the only adequate
means of payment - an exchange of goods. Gold is adequate
only to adjust international balances,
Italy depends on foreign sources for nearly all raw
materials in her manufacturing industries and finds payment
increasingly difficult as others impose restrictions on her
goods. But her own industries are being created back of
high tariff walls. Germany, deprived of the Alsace-Lorraine
coal and iron ore deposi t
s
f must sell more rather than less
manufactures in order to pay for those essential raw mate-
rials and to pay her recovery loans. Great Britain turns
again to protective duties as it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to pay for essential imports of foodstuffs and semi-
finished manufactures. The United States institutes re-
volutionary social controls in a retreat from surplus pro-
duct ion, behind the highest tariffs in her history.
A most important change in the status of the
United States, directly attributable to the war, receives
so much attention in current writing that it needs only to
be mentioned; the change from a debtor to a creditor nation.
In the failure to adjust economic factors to this change,
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however, tariffs play a very significant part. Loans were
placed with far too much freedom without any approved plan
as to the possible means of payment, in fact payment was
made still more difficult by further tariff increases.
Imports in far greater volume must be taken if markets are
to be found for the vast American productive capacity, or
many unwelcome restraints must be imposed in the adjustment
to a limited market.
It is true that restraints are necessary in the
course of accepting a larger volume of imports, and will
be as unwelcome to those directly involved. A choice of
goods to be received must be made according to some defi-
nite plan. Monopolistic and less efficient industries,
existing largely or wholly because of the tariff, would
have to be sacrificed for the general good.
That such an adjustment would be in the public
interest there can be little doubt, and it is true of all
the leading industrial countries. "The more imports a
country gets the better - provided it has the means of pay-
ing for them. The world needs for its economic health
more imports and not less, and of course more exports also,
1
for every import is an export from somewhare." How far a
government under the dominant control of capitalism, can
be expected to go along this road, is a question that would
take us far afield, but existing conditions appear to be
1. Cole, ETT, 87.
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forcing the answer. With a more equitable distribution
of wealth perhaps there would be no such thing as surplus
production; it is a logical theory.
The present urgent need, apart from the social
structure, is a sane recognition of the fact that the out-
standing world trend is one of economic interdependence
and that an extreme nationalism is not compatible with
interdependence. A discriminating regulation is needed;
one that recognizes trade as a system of exchange based
upon friendly and justified needs, to the end that all
may realize their best possibilities; one that abandons
the philosophy that traders must be enemies.
A tariff system properly conceived and admin-
istered can provide the means of promoting and regulating
mutual exchanges. Tariffs cannot be desirable ends in
themselves. Apart from producers of revenue, they cannot
be used for constructive ends unless limited and regulated
according to an intelligent plan. Indiscriminate use of
all such obstructions will lead again to war and war again
will solve nothing, but may dissolve everything. High
tariffs are now in existence on every hand and world con-
ditions do not indicate that they will be abandoned. They
can, however, be rededicated to the purpose of orderly
trade promotion by means of treaties, in the process of
negotiating for which, the particular needs of all may be
recognized and understood.
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Treaty bargaining has already proved an effective
means of decreasing tariffs in the particular spots that
become most troublesome. At present even the basic rates,
below which treaty rates cannot be established, are at
prohibitive levels.
Economic conferences which declare that obstruc-
tion has gone far enough and that it is time for the world
to go in the opposite direction, indicate a sane recog-
nition of the true problem. The fact that they are utterly
unable to translate the thought into action, indicates that
as yet their delegates have not approached the conferences
with approved plans regarding the specific commodities that
their respective nations are prepared to receive in greater
volume. Those that are already receiving more goods than
they are sending are waiting for this decision.
Many sections of the world can stand higher
levels of living, but limitations placed upon the national
productive capacity will never bring them about. An im-
mense purchasing power lies dormant in these areas, and an
infinitely greater purchasing power is doubtless possible
in the areas now considered fully developed. But such
potential increases will not be realized through obstruc-
tions to trade and industry.
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SUPPLEMENT A
TARIFFS AND CURRENCY INSTABILITY
Advantages of A Fixed Standard
One of the chief world trends traced in this
study, the increasing large-scale industrial produc-
tion of all the leading countries, seems to vindicate
the general adoption of a common monetary standard.
The steady growth of international exchanges of goods
and services has been greatly facilitated by the estab-
lishment of a fixed relation to gold of the many nation-
al currencies.
The gold standard fixes within narrow limits
the rates of exchange between different national units
of money. One of the most obvious advantages falls to
those people who are engaged in trading across national
boundaries. Business men are able to make contracts and
incur debts without any concern as to possible changes
1
in the relative value of the currencies involved.
In normal times only relatively small amounts
of gold are shipped between countries and the develop-
ment of trade is fostered by the stability of the medi-
um of exchange. Most countries are able to keep a
sufficient reserve of gold to support their currency
1. Cole, GWC, 203.
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issues and to make payments in gold when usual events
call for such payments.
Currencies and the World War
As a result of the war many of the important
trading nations suspended gold payments along with the
imposition of numerous trade restrictions outlined in
the preceding pages. The process of going upon an in-
convertible basis and of issuing a larger supply of
paper currency caused their internal levels of commodity
prices to rise, but not so rapidly as the external value
2
of their currencies fell. Currencies fluctuated wide-
ly in terms of gold and it was consequently unsafe to
make contracts for any considerable period of time,
despite the fact that it was vitally important for all
of the belligerent nations to regain their lost markets.
After the war the resumption of economic ac-
tivity was almost too impetuous. Each country came
out with a more active and powerful industrial equip-
ment than before, but their markets had vanished.
A great deal of capital had to be destroyed, since
many plants, constructed hastily and at a high cost,
were not suitable for peace time production, even had
3
it been possible to find markets. Even so, the
attempt to maintain such production was responsible for
2. Cole, Cr'.VC, 334.
3. Delle-Donne, ETF, 84.
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many emergency post-war tariff increases.
Banks were of little help in the financing
of industry at this time - their funds had been ab-
sorbed by war loans. The situation was particularly
serious for those countries which had to import raw
materials from those whose currencies were still at a
4
higher rate of exchange than their own. This condi-
tion would seem to offer a tremendous obstacle to
imports and a corresponding stimulous to exports in
the country with a depreciated exchange. "With
sterling at $4.00 the British producer can market
more profitably than at par, i.e., at $4.86. At the
depreciated rate he will receive on the sale of goods
for $1000. in the United States 250 instead of 210
5
pounds.
"
Mr. Sprague continues his discussion by calling
attention to the fact that the widespread departure
from a convertible basis was evidence of an unhealthy
condition which had already operated to place the trade
of the particular country in an abnormally unfavorable
position. Among other things, these influences had
caused a tendency to stimulate imports and a tendency
to check normal exports. The depreciated exchange
served chiefly as a temporary countervailing influence
and not as an influence by which to gain a permanent
4. Delle-Donne, ETP, 84.
5. O.M.W. Sprague, Annals , March 1921.
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6
advantage in world markets. It is conceivable that
such a countervailing effect will become a substantial
advantage in the event that the currency in question
is not stabilized, and depreciation is allowed to con-
tinue
.
The temporary nature of this trade advantage
is a point on which all authorities appear to agree,
and it is of utmost importance in drawing a conclusion
as to the relation between depreciated currencies and
tariff increases. More will be said of this presently.
The struggle to return to a convertible gold
basis was a desperate one. In 1920 European monetary
conditions were in a chaotic state. Price levels were
inflated, in some cases, more so than at the end of
the war, budgets were out of balance, and exchanges
7
were fluctuating violently. Reviewing the condition
8
at the end of 1924, Mr. Carothers wrote as follows:
"Whatever their present and future
policies may be, a large number of countries
can never bring their present volume of paper
money to its par value in gold. Twenty- two
such countries may be listed as follows:
France
?
Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Finland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
Portugal, Germany, Russia, Poland, Austria,
Hungary, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia,
Paraguay, and Peru. Each one of these coun-
tries must in one way or another, devalue its
paper circulation at some fixed rate of re-
pudiation.
6. O.M.W. Sprague, Annals , March 1921.
7. B.Ohlin, Annals
,
November 1927. -
8. Neil Carothers , Current History , December 1924.
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This is precisely what did happen, but the
process was slow and laborious - beset by a period of
sharp deflation during 1920 and 1921 which caused a
serious fall in the price-levels of world commodities
measured in terms of gold and the price-levels of
those countries which were on the gold standard or
9
approaching it. At the same time, certain countries
embarked on a course of wild currency inflation, a
process which sent their internal prices upward and
their external currency values more rapidly in the
opposite direction. Thus their goods for export were
at a discount in terms of external currencies, and
measures in retaliation were invited.
Currencies and the World Depression
It is interesting, not to say a trifle
pathetic, to consider the Report of the World Economic
Conference, adopted May 23, 1927, as it relates to the
10
world currency situation:
"Currency disorders have resulted in al-
most every country in a disproportion in the
wage levels in various trades, in the prices of
different commodi ti es, and in the relation between
wages and prices.
"The first step has already been taken
towards satisfying the desire for a return to a
more normal commercial regime through the stabi-
9. Cole, SWC, 334.
10. Annals
,
November 1927, 179.
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lization now effected of the currency of a
great number of countries whose exchanges had
been dislocated by the war and its conse-
quences.
"The Conference, convinced that
exchange stabilization constitutes one of the
foremost conditions for the restoration of
international trade, is most anxious to see
further progress in this direction."
In less than two years after the adjournment
of the World Conference, most of these countries, with
the exception of France and the United States, were
again forced to renounce their convertible gold basis,
and still later the United States fell into line. The
desperate effort had availed them little in view of the
fact that the creditor countries, chiefly France and
the United States, were taking all of their gold in
payment of war debts and subsequent commercial loans.
America invested and loaned to Europe in order that
Europe might buy her raw materials and pay her debts,
but high American tariffs prohibited payment by means
of larger quantities of European manufactured goods.
During this four or five year period, Ameri-
can tourists spent money freely in the debtor countries
and Americans shipped great quantities of goods with
foreign carriers, but such measures were not adequate
to equalize the foreign debts. The United States could
not support its production and trade by means of loans
indefinitely. The sudden and complete cessation of
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loans in 1929 did much to precipitate the economic
11
crisis in Europe.
Depreciated Currencies and Tariffs
It is possible to point out various studies
that have been made of the special form of price com-
petition which arises from the depreciation of for-
eign currencies. None of them ventures even an
approximate picture of the amount of tariff protec-
tion which may have been imposed because of this one
condition; in fact the studies invariably agree on the
impossibility of such measurement.
In the currency disturbances immediately
following the war, emergency tariffs and quotas were
imposed in an effort to maintain inflated industries -
as already mentioned - along with an effort to pro-
hibit an excessive flow of imports from the low cur-
rency countries, which was quite generally anticipated
but actually experienced in but few cases.
One very capable study indicates that England,
Belgium, Spain, Canada, United States, Union of South
Africa, New Zealand and Australia adopted various
methods specifically aimed at this so-called "exchange
12
dumping" with various results. The method employed
by each country is analyzed separately, together with
11. Cole, GWC, 212.
12. W. Muhlbach, Journal of Political Economy . June 1925.
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the reasons for its failure to offset the price dif-
ference at which it is aimed. England imposed a flat
ad valorem rate of 33 1/3 per cent with the specifica-
tion that the effects of exchange-dumping must first
be in evidence before the duty is applied. Several
of the others passed similar legislation. Any such
simple and rigid mechanism is hardly sufficient to
handle a situation, the primary element of which is a
constantly fluctuating price difference.
All authorities on this subject point out
with great care that any premium on the exports of a
country whose currency is depreciating is likely to
be only a temporary factor because of the tendency
of internal price levels to rise in proportion to the
fall of the external value. Thus, any advantage vanishes
with stabilization, providing there is no considerable
lag of the internal adjustments. "This premium is thus
dependent upon the process of depreciation rather than
13
upon the depreciation itself." Mr. Viner has this
14
to say, in his exhaustive study of the dumping problem:
"When a currency of a country is on
an inconvertible basis, and undergoing pro-
gressive depreciation, there may be for a time
a substantial divergence between its internal
and its external purchasing power."
The United States Tariff Commission concludes
a special examination of this problem with this para-
13. Muhlbach, op.cit.295.
14. Viner, DPIT, 16.
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graph :
"The foregoing considerations indicate
that great difficulty would be experienced in
levying and administering a tariff to offset
the low rates of exchange. A flat rate of duty
against all products from all countries ob-
viously will not accomplish the purposes in-
tended, because of the different degrees of
price adjustment to an international gold
basis. Not only is there a difference in the
extent of this adjustment among countries,
but the prices of different products in the
same country are affected in different degrees
by paper inflation. For this reason, off-
setting duties should be levied on specific
products and the rates should be fixed with
an eye to the particular source from which
protection is sought. Moreover, the list of
commodities given special protection should
be revised from time to time because, as the
adjusting process goes on, products are con-
stantly shifting from the class whose prices
are fixed locally in paper money to the class
of goods whose prices are on an international
gold basis and which, therefore, require no
offsetting duties against the exchange rate."
Freqeunt tariff changes have had a depress-
ing influence on international trade and the above
evidence is fairly convincing that the most rapid
manipulation of tariffs would be necessary to deal
with fluctuating exchange rates. The widespread
attempts are simply new difficulties for commerce.
Regardless of how unsuccessful in offsetting cur-
rency depreciation these higher tariffs may be, the
one fact of higher and higher rates stands out as
the result of unstable money.
Before any progress could be made toward
15. U.S. Tariff Commission, DEIT, 66.
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a general reduction, in accordance with the report of
the Vorld Conference, a world-wide depression came
along to force a repetition of the earlier difficul-
ties, but of greater intensity. The burden of debts
in terms of steadily falling commodity prices has
become intolerable and further currency devaluation
becomes necessary with retaliating tariff increases.
Quite apart from exchange-dumping, all debtor countries
were forced to restrict imports, lacking the means of
payment
.
The charts which follow indicate the relative
trade and currency declines in certain of the leading
nations.
In the case of the United States it is possible
to show the sharply rising tariff level as import prices
fall. This is partly automatic as a consequence of the
dominance of specific duty rates in the act of 1930; if
the tendency had been to extend the number of rates based
upon commodity values, the level of protection would
of course remain fixed.
It is difficult to secure similar statistical
evidence as yet regarding other tariff levels. The
trend is certain to be the same during this prolonged
depression. No trade restrictions have been removed,
except through particular treaties^ and many additional
ones have been imposed. Furthermore, experiments are
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being attempted, notably by Japan and Germany, to
maintain their export advantage by a manipulation of
currency, price, and wage levels. At present they
seem able to undersell all competition in a given
market. As existing measures prove inadequate to
offset their advantage, further restrictions will be
imposed.
And finally the lag of internal adjustments
is plainly shown by the experience of this last year
in the United States. The dollar was stabilized at a
depreciation of 41 per cent but internal price levels
have offset the difference by little more than one-half.
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